Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 47
Number 4 Symposium: Urban Intelligence and
the Emerging City

Article 11

2020

"We're Not in Kansas Anymore": Using State and Local Power to
Fulfill the Potential of the Opportunity Zone Program
Charlie Metzger

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj

Recommended Citation
Charlie Metzger, "We're Not in Kansas Anymore": Using State and Local Power to Fulfill the Potential of the
Opportunity Zone Program, 47 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1121 (2020).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol47/iss4/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

“ W E ’R E N O T IN K A N S A S A N Y M O R E ” : U S IN G
S T A T E A N D L O C A L P O W E R T O F U L F IL L T H E
PO TE NTIAL O F THE OPPORTUNITY Z ONE
PROGRAM
Charlie Metzger*
Introduction ........................................................................................... 1122
I. The Origins and Mechanics of the Opportunity Zone
Program ........................................................................................... 1128
A. Origins.................................................................................... 1128
B. Mechanics............................................................................... 1133
i. Opportunity Zone Selection .......................................... 1133
ii. Commentary on the Opportunity Zone Selection
Process ............................................................................ 1135
iii. Tax Benefits at the Core............................................... 1136
iv. Opportunity Zone Funds.............................................. 1137
v. Proposed Rulemaking and Commentary .................... 1138
II. The Danger of Unconstrained Capital and the Tension
between Place-Based and Person-Based Programs ................... 1140
III. Early Adopters: State and Local Responses to the
Opportunity Zone Initiative ......................................................... 1144

*
J.D. Candidate, Fordham Law School, 2021. A.B. Princeton University, 2012. I owe
many debts of gratitude to the people who helped make this piece a reality. Thanks
first to Professor Nestor Davidson, who advised this Note, for the wisdom and
guidance he has provided all throughout my law school career. Also to the labor and
community organizers who taught me how power is distributed in urban politics,
foremost among them Peter Ward, Jim Donovan, Julia Rybak, Bhav Tibrewal, and
Frank McMillan, and to the many opportunity zone and economic development
practitioners — in government, philanthropy, and industry — who agreed to be
interviewed for this piece. Thanks especially to my former supervisors in the Legal
Department of the New York State Housing Finance Agency who introduced me to
Affordable Housing Law and to Alexander Golding and Adam Rice who were
incredible sounding boards as the ideas in this work took shape. The staff of the
Urban Law Journal did a remarkable job shepherding this Note to completion and
my family did the same keeping me grounded along the way. And finally, to Kristen
McCarthy, whose life’s work is the creation of opportunity for children in historically
marginalized and under-resourced communities.

1121

1122

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

A. Overview................................................................................ 1144
B. Coordination Problems ........................................................ 1147
C. Case Studies ........................................................................... 1148
i. Louisville, KY .................................................................. 1148
ii. Cuyahoga County, Ohio and National Work by the
Kresge Foundation ....................................................... 1152
iii. Washington, D.C. .......................................................... 1160
IV. Analysis and Evaluation of Opportunity Zone Programs ........ 1165
A. Evaluation ............................................................................. 1166
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 1170
INTRODUCTION

In late August, 2019, the New York Times published an explosive
long-form article addressing the effects of a little-known federal
program designed to bring billions of dollars in investment to some of
the poorest neighborhoods in America.1 The piece, titled “How a
Trump Tax Break to Help Poor Communities Became a Windfall for
the Rich,” laid out a harsh indictment of the Opportunity Zone (OZ)
program, calling it a “once-in-a-generation bonanza for elite
investors.”2
The article’s authors, economics reporter Jesse Drucker and
investigative reporter Eric Lipton, argued in exhaustive detail that a
set of wealthy Americans — many of them with personal connections
to President Trump, his family, or his administration — are exploiting
the OZ program by taking advantage of its core tax benefits without
expanding access to capital for underserved communities or investing
in projects that will genuinely ameliorate poverty.3 “Instead,” the
authors wrote,
billions of [dollars of] untaxed investment profits are beginning to
pour into high-end apartment buildings and hotels, storage facilities
that employ only a handful of workers, and student housing in
bustling college towns . . . .”4 As a consequence, the federal
government is effectively “subsidizing luxury developments — often
within walking distance of economically distressed communities —

1. Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor
Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019),

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/E9DA-G4K9].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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that were in the works before Mr. Trump was even elected
president.5

The story ignited a firestorm on Twitter — particularly from the
OZ program’s defenders, who argued that the piece had
cherry-picked damning evidence instead of reporting in a manner that
was fair and even-handed.6 But perhaps the most innovative
response was a Twitter thread written by Matt Wachter, Vice
President of Finance & Development at the Erie Downtown
Development Corporation (Erie DDC) in Erie, Pennsylvania, who
offered a more local and nuanced critique of the Times article,
tweeting that because of the OZ program:
Instead of a 25-year redevelopment plan, @ErieDDC now
anticipates it can revitalize a series of largely vacant or abandoned
buildings at the heart of Erie’s downtown in as little as five years
while, in parallel, new investment is providing a shot-in-the-arm to
Erie’s emerging ecosystem of IT and cyber security small businesses,
many of whom are women or minority-owned . . . . No federal policy
in memory has galvanized as much excitement in our community.7

The responses cited above exemplify the current debate about the
OZ program. Its proponents argue that it is a legitimate anti-poverty
initiative, born from bipartisan consensus, with the potential to bring
much-needed investment dollars to communities starved for access to
capital and economic opportunity.8 They emphasize the duration of

5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Steven Glickman (@StevenGGlickman), TWITTER (Sept. 1, 2019,
2:38
PM),
https://twitter.com/StevenGGlickman/status/1168231608119439360
[https://perma.cc/B4RR-ZFJ6] (“I’m disappointed that the @nytimes chose to cherry
pick a handful of anecdotes about the #OpportunityZones marketplace to support
conclusions that don’t reflect the reality of this bipartisan program that is having real
impact around the country.”).
7. Matt Wachter (@MWachter26), TWITTER (Sept. 20, 2019, 2:54 PM),
https://twitter.com/mwachter26/status/1175121035592646657
[https://perma.cc/2K2B-V4QM]. Wachter later published his argument in a piece for
LinkedIn Pulse. See Matt Wachter, If Only the NY Times Visited Erie, PA,
LINKEDIN
PULSE
(Oct.
1,
2019),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/only-ny-times-visited-erie-pa-matt-wachter?articleId
=6584802717942759424#comments-6584802717942759424&trk=public_profile_article
_view [https://perma.cc/TCN6-8TXR].
8. For instance, former Obama Administration official, OZ investor, and
evangelist Steve Glickman has cited the involvement of Austan Goolsbee and Jared
Bernstein, both alumni of the Obama White House. See, e.g., Glickman, supra note
6; see also John C. Fleming, Opportunity Zones Aren’t a Gimmick — They’re a
Legitimate
Investment
Option,
FORTUNE
(Sept.
23,
2019),
https://fortune.com/2019/09/23/opportunity-zones-investment-trump-taxes/ (“Those
looking for socially conscious investing can rest assured that these Opportunity Zone
investments will target development in areas of the country that need it most. Last
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the program and cite a range of projects with social benefits which are
already in the development pipeline.9 The program’s critics, which
include the New York Times Editorial Board in an article published
two months after the late August long-form piece cited earlier, argue
the OZ program is little more than a sophisticated handout to rich
investors.10 They contend that while the OZ program’s “stated
purpose is to drive big money into investment deserts,” it is in reality,
a “black comedy” allowing “a massive waste of public resources for
the benefit of a wealthy few.”11 And caught somewhere in the middle
are the state and local officials trying to make the program work.
The purpose of this Note is not to insert itself into the debate about
the ethics or legitimacy of the OZ program. While there are good
reasons to be skeptical of the program’s effectiveness as an
anti-poverty mechanism — not least the set of high-profile OZ Fund
managers, like the recently-pardoned “junk bond king” Michael
Milken,12 who are not known for their concern for the poor — there
are also early signs that the program is being leveraged to create
social impact in some economically under-resourced areas.13

year, the unemployment rate in Opportunity Zones was nearly 1.6 times higher than
the average U.S. census tract. Similarly, the average poverty rate across Opportunity
Zones exceeded 32%.”).
9. Ben Carson, Opportunity Zones: A New Dawn for Economic Opportunity,
CLEAR
POL’Y
(Apr.
26,
2019),
REAL
https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2019/04/26/opportunity_zones_a_new_dawn_
for_economic_opportunity_111177.html [https://perma.cc/H668-AM6T] (“Last week,
I visited Birmingham, Alabama’s ‘Campus of Hope,’ where thousands of residents in
Birmingham public housing will soon get access to valuable resources to help put
them on the path to financial self-sufficiency. I also traveled to Little Rock, Arkansas
to tour the development of Cumberland Towers. Each of these sites is situated in an
Opportunity Zone, which means today’s snapshot represents the ‘before’ pictures on
a self-development path made possible by the combined power of private-sector
investment and this Administration’s foresight in public policy.”).
10. Opportunity Zones — For Billionaires, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/opinion/trump-tax-opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/V75L-5MSN].
11. Id.
12. Reis Thebault, Who Is Michael Milken, the ‘Junk Bond King’ Trump Just
Pardoned?,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
18,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/02/18/michael-milken-pardon/
[https://perma.cc/466U-VNZ5]; see also Laura Davison, Mnuchin Says He Didn’t
Know Milken Would Benefit from Tax Help, ACCT. TODAY (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.accountingtoday.com/articles/mnuchin-says-he-didnt-know-milken-woul
d-benefit-from-tax-help [https://perma.cc/MM64-8L5D].
13. See, e.g., Logan Hullinger, Innovation District Plan in York City Receives Big
Boost from Opportunity Zone, YORK DISPATCH (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/local/2019/08/23/innovation-district-plan-yo
rk-city-receives-big-boost-opportunity-zone/2083783001/
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Furthermore, as an empirical matter, the jury is largely still out on
whether the program will live up to its stated purpose — which its
creators have been quick to point out. Measuring its effectiveness is
especially complex since the OZ program’s tax benefits are deferred
over an extended time horizon.14 And suggestions that the program
should be completely repealed are politically impractical — at least
for the foreseeable future, the OZ program is a legislative fait
accompli.
This Note is also not primarily focused on suggesting remedies to
the structure of the OZ program at the federal level. Possible federal
fixes have been spelled out in a high degree of detail across many
forums, from the halls of Congress to the pages of this very Journal.15
Instead, this Note looks at the implementation of the OZ program
closer to the ground: in the states and localities where OZ Funds are
investing capital and governments are engineering policy responses to
attract and then channel that investment. This kind of analysis is
warranted for a range of reasons — foremost among them is the fact
that federal regulation surrounding the OZ program is distressingly
skeletal.16 The enabling statutory language, included in the 2017 Tax

[https://perma.cc/QE7K-8RDR] (“The high-tech Innovation District planned for
York City’s Northwest Triangle is expected to be three times larger than initially
planned, thanks to the area being a federally designated opportunity zone.”).
14. See Glickman, supra note 6 (“This program is designed for patient investors,
and the real value comes after 10 years, with only a very small incentive upfront. That
means smart money will look for places that have a long runway for growth (i.e.
South Side of Chicago, Atlanta, and Detroit).”).
15. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Wyden Introduces
Legislation to Reform Opportunity Zone Program (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-members-news/wyden-introduces-legislationto-reform-opportunity-zone-program[https://perma.cc/9F3E-7W32].
Senator
Wyden’s bill would make four principal changes to the program:
Require annual, public information reporting from Opportunity Funds and
annual statements to the IRS from fund investors. Eliminate loopholes that
could allow ‘sin list’ investments like casinos and prohibit investments in
stadiums and luxury apartments. Terminate zones that are not low-income
or impoverished, while allowing states to replace zones that are terminated.
Tighten existing rules to ensure that this generous incentive goes to
productive, new investments that are actually in zones, and not to projects
that were already underway or investors trying to park their money tax-free.
Id. See also Victoria Lee, Opportunity without Reach: The Problems with the

Opportunity Zone Program and the Need for Clarification, Oversight, and
Regulation, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117, 143 (2019).

16. Furthermore, many of the programs acknowledge that this kind of local
leadership is essential to making the program work. See, e.g., John Lettieri & Steve
Glickman, Local Leadership Is Key for Successful Opportunity Zones, THE HILL
(Apr.
8,
2018),
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/382135-local-leadership-is-key-for-successful-oppo
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Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA), is only six pages long.17 And while the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently issued its final rules
governing OZs — laying out the regulatory framework which will
govern the mechanics of the program — those regulations are not
intended to direct capital with any geographic specificity within
existing OZs or to place additional federal restrictions around where
and how capital can be invested at a granular level.18 At least at this
early stage, the purpose of the regulations seems to be to clarify the
mechanics of OZ tax benefits.19
This bare-bones regulation is particularly striking given the sheer
size and scope of the OZ program. Early predictions are that OZs
will drive “billions — even trillions — of dollars in long-term
investment into historically impoverished urban and rural census
tracts across the country”20 and will cost the federal government on
the order of $1.6 billion in lost capital gains tax revenue from 2018–
2027.21 And since “new regulations stipulate that the program’s

rtunity-zones [https://perma.cc/QBL5-GZCA] (“The fate of Opportunity Zones
ultimately won’t be determined in Washington. Instead, Congress has placed a
powerful tool in the hands of governors and mayors, who must ensure it is deployed
thoughtfully to reinvigorate struggling communities and foster economic
dynamism.”).
17. See infra Part I for a discussion about the creation of the OZ program. For the
enabling legislation, see Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 13823 (2017).
18. See, e.g., John Sciarretti & Michael Novogradac, Opportunity Zones Final
Regulations — A Detailed Look, NOVOGRADAC (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/opportunity-zones-final-regulationsdetailed-look [https://perma.cc/SP46-JGXR]; see also Michael Novogradac, Clarity

Provided by Second Tranche of Treasury Regulations to Incent More Investment in
Opportunity Zones Businesses (Part I), NOVOGRADAC (Apr. 17, 2019),

https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/clarity-provided-second-tranche-tre
asury-regulations-incent-more-investment-opportunity-zones
[https://perma.cc/S7HC-4MSJ] [hereinafter Novogradac, Second Tranche] (“The
biggest takeaway is that the guidance addresses gating issues that were limiting
OZ-incented investment in operating businesses, and provides added tax clarity to
the start-up, operation and wind-down of a qualified opportunity funds (QOFs).”).
19. Novogradac, Second Tranche, supra note 18.
20. LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., NAVIGATING THE OPPORTUNITY ZONES:
COMMUNITY
PARTNERS
4
(2019),
https://www.lisc.org/media/filer_public/55/63/55635ee3-dffc-4d6d-8f5c-2e537ad567c8/
072219_lisc_opportunity_playbook_community_stakeholders.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VK8C-VVNZ]. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin predicted that
OZs would generate more than $100 billion in investment in October 2018. Julia
Manchester, Mnuchin Predicts $100B in Cap Investment from New Opportunity
HILL
(Sept.
28,
2018),
Zones,
https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/408980-mnuchin-predicts-100b-in-cap-investment-from
-new-opportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/X8X4-6VMK].
21. SCOTT EASTMAN & NICOLE KAEDING, TAX FOUND., OPPORTUNITY ZONES:
WHAT
WE
KNOW
AND
WHAT
WE
DON’T
1
(2019),
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benefits [will] continue through 2047,” the true revenue impact on the
federal government could be decades long.22
However, despite thin regulation from the federal government of
the OZ program, a diverse range of state and local governments
across the country did not wait for the IRS to finalize its rules and
have instead generated policy responses designed both to attract and
channel investment and to also place additional guardrails on the OZ
program.23 This is not surprising — economic development is hardly
the province of the federal government alone. And — to paraphrase
Justice Louis Brandeis writing almost a century ago — states have
always served as “laboratories of democracy” within our system of
federalism, designing policy approaches to meet a range of issues.24

https://files.taxfoundation.org/20190107155914/Opportunity-Zones-What-We-Knowand-What-We-Don%E2%80%99t-FF-630.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ74-LAKH].
22. Id. It is worth noting that the OZ program is off to a slower than expected
start. See, e.g., Ruth Simon & Peter Grant, Opportunity Zone Funds Are off to a
Slow Start, Lagging behind Heady Expectations, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/opportunity-zone-funds-are-off-to-a-slow-start-lagging-b
ehind-heady-expectations-11571742002 [https://perma.cc/KN9C-5KPM].
[O]pportunity-zone funds have so far, on average, raised less than 15% of
their goals, according to a new analysis by Novogradac & Co., a San
Francisco accounting firm that advises fund managers and investors on tax
incentives. The Novogradac data includes 103 funds set up to invest in
opportunity zones. These funds, which include many of the industry’s
largest, have raised a combined $3 billion of the roughly $22.7 billion they
seek. Novogradac said it is aware of 285 of these types of funds, though not
all have shared fundraising details.
Id. That said, “it isn’t surprising that the program is taking time to pick up steam,
especially given that regulations aren’t yet final and these are new markets for many
investors.” Id. As of January 2020, the most recent data from Novogradac show 292
OZ Funds reporting more than $6.7 billion in equity raised, a significant increase
over the prior month when 184 funds reported having raised $4.46 billion. Michael
Novogradac, Opportunity Funds Listing Shows Strong Increase in Investment,
NOVOGRADAC
(Jan.
8,
2020),
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zone-resource-center/opportu
nity-funds-listing
[https://perma.cc/Q4DP-G6MY]
[hereinafter
Novogradac,
Opportunity Funds Listing].
23. See, e.g., Michael Novogradac, State, Local Governments Work to Steer
Opportunity
Zones
Investment,
NOVOGRADAC
(Apr.
1,
2019),
https://www.novoco.com/periodicals/articles/state-local-governments-work-steer-opp
ortunity-zones-investment [https://perma.cc/7KMN-J2SP] [hereinafter Novogradac,
State, Local Governments].
24. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386–87 (1932); see generally
Laboratories
of
Democracy
Database,
NEW
AM.,
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/laboratories-of-democracy/
[https://perma.cc/VU72-96NV] (last visited Mar. 16, 2020).
[M]any states and communities are fulfilling the role that Justice Brandeis
envisioned when he called them ‘laboratories of democracy.’ Sometimes by
direct ballot initiatives and sometimes by legislative action, states and
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The purpose of this Note is to canvass these state and local policies to
answer a compelling question: what can state and local governments
do in response to a federal investment incentive program of this
magnitude with so few guardrails?
Part I introduces the OZ program. It begins by tracing the history
of the idea that became the first legislative attempt at enacting the
OZ program into law, from its inception at a think tank called the
Economic Innovation Group (EIG), to its inclusion in the TCJA, to
its implementation by the IRS. It then explains the principal
components of the program and summarizes the major critiques
offered by observers.
Part II lays out one of the main challenges the OZ program faces:
the danger of unconstrained investment. It delineates the difference
between place-based and person-based economic development
programs and stacks the OZ program up against some of its
intellectual forerunners (like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) and the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC)).
Part III analyzes the toolkit being developed and deployed by early
adopters at the state and local level who are attempting to address the
problem of unconstrained capital. Specifically, it looks at OZ
programs in Louisville, KY; Cuyahoga County, OH; and Washington,
D.C. It draws out the policy initiatives that are common across these
different locations and also highlights their differences.
Finally, Part IV evaluates the policy choices made by these early
adopters. It also suggests a range of other tools that state and
(principally) local governments can use to attract capital, and then
direct the flow of investment traffic.
I. THE ORIGINS AND MECHANICS OF THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE
PROGRAM
A. Origins

The idea that eventually became the OZ initiative was first
proposed in a 2015 whitepaper titled “Unlocking Private Capital to
Facilitate Economic Growth in Distressed Areas,” authored by two
experts affiliated with the Economic Innovation Group (EIG), a

Id.

localities have been moving forward, toward a more inclusive democracy,
and testing new ideas for financing campaigns, structuring voting systems,
setting district boundaries, and expanding participation.
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Washington, D.C.-based think tank.25 Notably, despite writing for
EIG, the authors credentialed themselves in the report based on their
affiliations with think tanks at opposite ends of the ideological
spectrum: the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the
American Enterprise Institute.26 The paper began with the premise
that America’s recovery from the financial crisis and the Great
Recession had been robust but geographically uneven: “[W]hile
certain areas of the country are doing remarkably well and nearing or
exceeding their pre-recession economic states, the recovery has been
profoundly uneven, with large swaths of the country facing chronic
rates of long-term unemployment and historically low levels of new
investment.”27 As an illustration, the report offered unemployment
statistics from around the country — comparing in one instance, the

25. JARED BERNSTEIN & KEVIN A. HASSETT, ECON. INNOVATION GRP.,
UNLOCKING PRIVATE CAPITAL TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DISTRESSED
AREAS
(2015),
https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Unlocking-Private-Capital-to-Facilitate-G
rowth.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL5G-ED3F]. EIG was founded jointly by Sean Parker,
the creator of Napster and Facebook’s first president; John Lettieri, former vice
president at the Organization for International Investment and once an aide to
Senator Chuck Hagel; and Steven Glickman, an alumnus of the Obama White
House. EIG describes itself as a “bipartisan public policy organization that combines
innovative research and data-driven advocacy to address America’s most pressing
economic challenges.” About Us, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., http://eig.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/QC5E-7ZB7] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020); see also Steven Bertoni, An

Unlikely Group of Billionaires and Politicians Has Created the Most Unbelievable
Tax
Break
Ever,
FORBES
(July
18,
2018),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesdigitalcovers/2018/07/17/an-unlikely-group-of-billi
onaires-and-politicians-has-created-the-most-unbelievable-tax-break-ever/#54815872
1485 [https://perma.cc/GEE3-YN3M]; Andrea Chang, Entrepreneurs Launch
Economic Innovation Group, a D.C. Think Tank, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015),
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-economic-innovation-group-201
50331-story.html [https://perma.cc/8UDS-XXK4]. Tracing the history of the OZ
concept is essential, since many of the early concepts EIG developed went on to be
included in the TCJA in 2017.
26. BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 25.
27. Id. at 2. In this debate, one point of agreement is that communities of color
have a significantly harder time accessing capital than white communities. See, e.g.,
ROBERT FAIRLIE, ET AL., BLACK AND WHITE: ACCESS TO CAPITAL AMONG
MINORITY-OWNED
STARTUPS
2
(2016),
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/17-003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LF3B-BSED] (“Black-owned businesses are persistently smaller
and face more difficulty in raising external capital. Large differences in credit
worthiness are important for explaining the difference. Even controlling for credit
worthiness, persistent differences in perceptions of treatment by banks are also
important.”); see also Access to Capital Is Still a Challenge for Minority Business
Enterprises, MINORITY BUS. DEV. AGENCY (Mar. 1, 2010, 2:13 PM),
https://www.mbda.gov/news/blog/2010/07/access-capital-still-challenge-minority-busin
ess-enterprises [https://perma.cc/WG48-KTXX].
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unemployment rates in Fresno and San Francisco, California (11%
and 5%, respectively, as of December 2014, even though the cities are
less than 200 miles apart).28
The report painted a grim picture of the human cost of
unemployment: “distressed and traumatized workers who face
plummeting incomes, stalling career progressions, and cracking
self-confidence. In addition to these intuitive tragic effects of
unemployment, research has also identified other negative side
effects, the most distressing of which is an increase in mortality
following job loss.”29 The report next considered — and largely
dismissed — a range of federal subsidies which have been attempted
in order to spur development in distressed communities:
“empowerment zones (EZ), renewal communities (RC), enterprise
communities (EC), and the New Market Tax Credit (NMTC).”30 The
authors argued that the empirical research analyzing these programs
had shown their results to be mixed, at best.31
Accordingly, EIG proposed a new mechanism — a “New Model
for Attracting Private Investment.”32 Since the private sector had
little incentive to invest in higher-risk neighborhoods and provide an
injection of capital, the federal government ought to give them one.33
This policy solution would attempt to spur private investment in
distressed neighborhoods by taking advantage of the staggering
quantity of unrealized capital gains in the United States, which EIG
estimated to be roughly $2.26 trillion at the time the report was
written.34 The authors recommended a new kind of investment
vehicle — a “structure analogous to that of a venture capital firm or

28. BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 25, at 2.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5. While the report argued that the NMTC was the most successful
program of the set it considered, it still contended that “the NMTC is not structured
to induce the kind of larger-scale investment that can accelerate the revitalization of
an entire community.” Id. at 10. Its criticism of all the programs it considered boiled
down to complexity and underutilization, weak or misaligned incentives, the
programs’ restrictive scope, interaction with other programs, and the absence of force
multipliers. Id. at 11–15.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. at 16. The report made the assumption that “[f]or political and fiscal
reasons, large-scale public sector investment is unlikely to happen anytime soon.” Id.
Accordingly, this public sector investment would have to be “supplemented by
private sector investment to support robust economic growth.” Id.
33. Id. “Private sector investors have little current incentive to invest in higher
risk ventures in economically depressed communities, but the return on investment
for doing so may increase if the existing friction could be deferred or eliminated.” Id.
34. Id.
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mutual fund company,” which would operate in specific geographic
areas, and deploy special tax benefits established for them, which
“would apply so long as the investments stayed” in those areas.35
Bernstein and Hassett argued this kind of policy would solve the
shortcomings inherent in earlier economic development subsidies,
like pooled assets, the elimination of first-mover problems, and lower
risk to each individual investor.36 Their report closed by making a
recommendation for how the program could work mechanically:
“[U]nrealized capital gains might be rolled over into special funds
constrained to invest in distressed communities, with the capital gains
taxed only if the money is withdrawn from the qualified funds down
the road.”37
Bernstein and Hassett’s paper was the inspiration for the first
legislative attempt at enacting the OZ program into law: the
“Investing in Opportunity Act,” introduced jointly by Senators Cory
Booker (D-NJ) and Tim Scott (R-SC), and Congressmen Ron Kind
(D-WI) and Pat Tiberi (R-OH), first during the waning months of the
Obama Administration, and then again in February of 2017 — just
weeks after President Trump was sworn into office.38
The bill’s bipartisan sponsors were enthusiastic, describing the
program’s possible benefits in terms designed to appeal to
constituencies on either side of the aisle. Senator Booker, a
Democrat, emphasized the bill’s potential to expand access to capital:
[B]arriers stand between too many communities and access to the
capital needed to generate economic growth and opportunity. In an
era of capital moving overseas or going towards uses that don’t
maximize opportunity for most Americans, our bipartisan legislation
will help lower these barriers and jumpstart economic development
and entrepreneurship.39

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
See OLIVIA BARROW, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OPPORTUNITY

ZONES
8–11
(2019),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2019/08-04_Opportunity-Zones.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q25U-KHSK]. The bill was introduced concurrently in the House
and the Senate. See Investing in Opportunity Act, H.R. 828, 115th Cong. (2017);
Investing in Opportunity Act, S. 293, 115th Cong. (2017).
39. John Avlon, Cory Booker and Tim Scott’s Bipartisan Plan to Wage a Smart
War
on
Poverty,
DAILY
BEAST
(Apr.
13,
2017),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/cory-booker-and-tim-scotts-bipartisan-plan-to-wage-a
-smart-war-on-poverty [https://perma.cc/QMG7-JK25].
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Congressman Tiberi, a Republican, observed that the program
would stimulate investment without requiring an outlay of
government funds: “We’re not writing a check from the federal
government. We’re getting private-sector dollars. It wouldn’t be up
to some bureaucrat or congressman in Washington, D.C. It would be
up to the people in the community who would tailor the investment to
what they think would actually work.”40
The OZ concept reappeared several months later as a last-minute
addition to the TCJA, the “biggest overhaul of the US tax code in
more than 30 years.”41 It was added at Senator Scott’s insistence; in
interviews he connected the program to his upbringing in poverty in
South Carolina.42 Incidentally, at the time the TCJA was being
debated, Kevin Hassett, the co-author of the EIG whitepaper
proposing the OZ idea, had been appointed by President Trump to
serve as the Chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers.
Hassett spoke approvingly of the addition in the weeks leading up to
the bill’s passage by Congress.43 However, the inclusion of OZs to
the TCJA went largely unnoticed.44 The New York Times noted that

40. Id.
41. Trump Tax Plan: The Key Points from the Final Bill, GUARDIAN (Dec. 19,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/19/trump-tax-plan-whats-in-the-finalbill [https://perma.cc/68PX-9UA3] [hereinafter Trump Tax Plan].
42. See Jim Tankersley, Tucked into the Tax Bill, a Plan to Help Distressed
America,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
29,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/business/tax-bill-economic-recovery-opportunity
-zones.html [https://perma.cc/V5RC-5968] (“The zones were included in the tax law
by Senator Tim Scott, a South Carolina Republican who was born into poverty in
North Charleston, and based on a bill he co-sponsored in 2017 with several
Democrats . . . . ‘I came out of one of these communities,’ [Scott said], ‘so I believe
that there’s untapped potential in every state in the nation.’”).
43. Id. (“‘This is a little billion-and-a-half dollar part’ of the law, Kevin Hassett,
the chairman of Mr. Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers, said in an interview.
‘But if it’s successful, we’ll look back 10 years from now and say this was one of the
most important parts of the tax bill, and one we didn’t talk nearly enough about.’”).
The Times also took note of Mr. Hassett’s connection to EIG and the research which
proposed OZs to begin with:
Mr. Hassett has a longtime interest in providing tax incentives for economic
development in distressed areas. He said he first began discussing
opportunity zones with Mr. Parker several years ago at a meeting in Mr.
Parker’s Greenwich Village home. Before joining the Trump
administration, Mr. Hassett wrote several white papers to help elevate the
idea as part of an extensive, multiyear effort by the Economic Innovation
Group to win support.

Id.

44. Media Coverage of the TCJA focused much more on tax cuts for wealthy
individuals and corporations, as well as changes to the standard deduction and the
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while Senator Scott reported speaking with both President Trump
and Hassett about the idea before the bill’s passage, “in the rush to
pass the bill over the course of a few frenzied weeks, the idea was
never debated on the floor of the House or Senate. It was never
promoted by Republican leaders or the White House.”45 President
Trump signed the TCJA into law at the end of December 2017.46
B. Mechanics

This Section gives an overview of how OZs work mechanically.
While the tax law surrounding OZs is complicated, at the heart of the
program is a basic bargain: investors agree to inject revenue from
capital gains into certain low-income census tracts for a prescribed
length of time in exchange for tax benefits from the IRS.47

i. Opportunity Zone Selection
The first step of implementing the OZ program was assigned to
America’s governors (as well as the chief executives of possessions
and territories), who were allotted 90 days from the enactment of the
TCJA to choose which low-income census tracts would be designated
as OZs. For OZ selection purposes, the definition of “low-income
census tract” comes from Section 45D(e) of the tax code, the
NMTC.48 Governors were permitted to designate up to 25% of

State and Local Tax Deduction (SALT). For example, two widely circulated pieces
on the TCJA did not mention the OZ program at all. See Trump Tax Plan, supra
note 41; see also Heather Long, The Final GOP Tax Bill Is Complete. Here’s What Is
in
It,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
15,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/15/the-final-gop-tax-bill-is-c
omplete-heres-what-is-in-it/ [https://perma.cc/VK8U-ALTL].
45. Tankersley, supra note 42. Despite giving the OZ concept a more favorable
treatment than it would go on to do in 2019, the New York Times did express early
skepticism, noting that “risks remain, including whether investors will steer dollars
toward areas that really need investment.” See id.
46. John Wagner, Trump Signs Sweeping Tax Bill into Law, WASH. POST (Dec.
22,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/12/22/trump-signs-sweep
ing-tax-bill-into-law/ [https://perma.cc/8XDE-K4QF].
47. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/AA7S-GLK8] (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) (“These zones are
designed to spur economic development and job creation in distressed communities
throughout the country and U.S. possessions by providing tax benefits to investors
who invest eligible capital into these communities.”).
48. ECON. INNOVATION GRP., OPPORTUNITY ZONES: A NEW ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
TOOL
FOR
LOW-INCOME
COMMUNITIES
1
(2018),
https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Guidance-for-Governors-FINAL.pdf
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eligible census tracts as OZs. Most significantly, they were also
permitted to select a number of non-low-income census tracts as OZs
with some restrictions, including the restriction that higher-income
OZs must be geographically contiguous to low-income tracts and
have roughly the same median family income (not exceeding 125% of
a neighboring low-income tract).49 The OZ program placed a cap on
these higher-income OZs, so governors were able to designate only
up to 5% of their OZs in this manner.50 After finishing their selection
process, governors submitted their designations of both low-income
and higher-income tracts to the Treasury Secretary for certification.51
Certification by the Department of the Treasury lasts a decade,
irrespective of whether the underlying economics of a particular
census tract change over time.52

[https://perma.cc/X64V-ZAGN] (summarized as “[1] Tracts in which the poverty rate
is at least 20 percent; or [2] Tracts in which the median family income does not
exceed 80 percent of the statewide median family income if located outside of a
metropolitan area; or [3] Tracts in which the median family income does not exceed
80 percent of the statewide median family income or the metropolitan area median
family income, whichever is higher”). This aspect of the OZ program was itself
controversial from the start; the Treasury Department provided the census maps
from the American Community Survey, dated from 2011–2015, and so was in some
cases already six to seven years old at the time that governors were choosing OZs.
See, e.g., Adam Looney, Will Opportunity Zones Help Distressed Residents or Be a
Tax Cut for Gentrification?, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/02/26/will-opportunity-zones-help-distr
essed-residents-or-be-a-tax-cut-for-gentrification/
[https://perma.cc/GV9W-9G8W]
(“[S]tates can designate once-poor neighborhoods that have already gentrified over
the last several years. In Washington D.C., for instance, qualifying areas include the
planned developments around DC United’s new stadium at Buzzard Point, where
investors plan to invest hundreds of millions in and around the stadium, and the
NoMa neighborhood where office buildings and pricey apartments are sprouting.”);
see also Steven Berman & Louis Weller, Opportunity Zone Investments: The New
Emerald City of Tax Law, 28 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 8, 9 (2019) (“One
of the things that one notices when reviewing the designated low income
communities for NMTC purposes, and then the 25% of those census tracts that are
designated for OZone purposes, is that many of those census tracts are already
attractive locations for business investment even without the OZone designation.”).
49. Zachary Patton, Need Help Understanding the Opportunity Zones
Eligibility?,
ENTERPRISE
(Feb.
9,
2018),
https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/blog/understanding-opportunity-zones-eligibili
ty [https://perma.cc/S7KN-CTBT] (“We have received questions on this regarding
whether a tract has to meet the 125 percent threshold for all contiguous Low-Income
Communities. Our understanding of the guidance provided by the IRS on February
8, 2018 is that it need only satisfy this requirement for at least one contiguous
Low-Income Community.”).
50. Id.
51. ECON. INNOVATION GRP., supra note 48, at 1 (governors with fewer than 100
low-income census tracts in their states could still designate up to 25 tracts).
52. Id.
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ii. Commentary on the Opportunity Zone Selection Process
One common criticism of OZs focuses on this stage of the rollout
process and takes issue with the ability of governors to choose
relatively higher-income neighborhoods for inclusion. EIG, where
OZs were born, wrote about this option in favorable terms, arguing
that it provided governors with “real-world flexibility in assembling
economically meaningful zones from individual census tracts.”53
Other observers expressed concern that it would funnel capital to
already-gentrifying neighborhoods.54 Another line of criticism in this
same vein focuses on how gubernatorial selection of OZs was prone
to rent-seeking and lobbyist influence,55 or clerical error.56

53. Id. at 2.
54. See, e.g., Samantha Jacoby, Potential Flaws of Opportunity Zones Loom, as
Do Risks of Large-Scale Tax Avoidance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan.
11,
2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/potential-flaws-of-opportunity-zones-loom
-as-do-risks-of-large-scale-tax [https://perma.cc/N3VR-M9VL].
55. See, e.g., Jeff Ernsthausen & Justin Elliott, How a Tax Break to Help the
Poor Went to NBA Owner Dan Gilbert, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-a-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-nba-ow
ner-dan-gilbert [https://perma.cc/F38A-PHYW] (Billionaire and Cavaliers owner
Dan Gilbert “influenced the local [OZ] selection process, as well, other emails
obtained by ProPublica show: Quicken’s top lobbyist was so enmeshed in the process,
his name appears on an opportunity zone map made by the city economic
development organization, recommending part of downtown be included in the tax
break. No other non-city officials are named on the document”); see also, Justin
Elliott, et al., A Trump Tax Break to Help the Poor Went to a Rich GOP Donor’s
Superyacht
Marina,
PROPUBLICA
(Nov.
14,
2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/superyacht-marina-west-palm-beach-opportunity-z
one-trump-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-a-rich-gop-donor
[https://perma.cc/38ZN-TAQU] (“The state of Florida, based on an analysis of
unemployment and poverty rates, had not originally intended to pick the census tract
containing the superyacht marina for the program. But those plans changed in
response to [billionaire Wayne, Jr.] Huizenga’s lobbying, according to documents
from the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity obtained by ProPublica.”);
Jeff Ernsthausen & Justin Elliott, A Trump Tax Cut Meant to Help Poor Areas
Could Pay off for Kevin Plank and Goldman Sachs Thanks to Misaligned Maps,
SUN
(June
19,
2019),
BALT.
https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/real-estate/bs-bz-plank-opportunity-zone-201
90612-story.html [https://perma.cc/2NS7-HLQK] (“But the census tract became
eligible to be picked as an opportunity zone because of misaligned maps. Tiny
differences between the maps used to delineate opportunity zones and empowerment
zones — a Clinton administration incentive for economically distressed communities
— showed an overlap between them at that sliver of a parking lot, which the U.S.
Treasury Department decided made the tract eligible. Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan
chose the area for the program after his aides met with lobbyists for the project.”).
56. Robert Orr, These Opportunity Zones Shouldn’t Exist — Scandal or Innocent
Mistake?,
NISKANEN
CTR.
(Nov.
4,
2019),
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Empirically, more than 42,000 census tracts around the country
were eligible for designation as OZs; from those, governors selected
roughly 8700, of which 230 were higher-income, contiguous tracts.57
This represented 2.6% of all OZs chosen, well below the 5% cap
imposed by the enabling legislation.58 An early analysis of the tracts
selected for inclusion in the OZ program, performed by the Urban
Institute, found that “the designated tracts have lower incomes,
higher poverty rates, and higher unemployment rates than eligible
nondesignated tracts.”59 At the same time, however, “[the] analysis
shows minimal targeting of the program toward disinvested
communities by a measure of investment flows developed by the
researchers.”60

iii. Tax Benefits at the Core
The core of the OZ program is a set of two tax incentives offered to
investors, which practitioners have christened the “Deferral Benefit”
and the “Exclusion Benefit” in the legal literature.61 The Deferral
Benefit allows an investor to sell an asset, realize a capital gain, invest
that gain (the “underlying gain”) in a qualified OZ fund (OZFund),
and defer payment of capital gains tax on the underlying gain until

https://www.niskanencenter.org/these-opportunity-zones-shouldnt-exist-scandal-or-in
nocent-mistake/ [https://perma.cc/K5LV-ERTY].
Apart from the improperly classified LIC tract in Detroit (tract ID
26163517200), misclassifications also appear to have occurred in Los
Angeles, CA (06037206020) and Oklahoma City, OK (40109103200).
Furthermore, these misclassifications were instrumental to the improper
designation of two additional OZs through the Contiguous Tract Criteria
(tracts 26163517000 & 06037206031 respectively). In total, five OZ tracts
were misclassified. While two of these can retain their OZ status under a
reclassification as contiguous tracts with legitimate LICs, the other three
OZs are entirely improper — that is, they should not have qualified under
the requirements stipulated by the TCJA.

Id.

57. BRETT THEODOS, ET AL., URBAN INST., DID STATES MAXIMIZE THEIR
OPPORTUNITY
ZONE
SELECTIONS?
2
(2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98445/did_states_maximize_their
_opportunity_zone_selections_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/75C6-68DK].
58. Id.
59. Brett Theodos & Brady Meixell, Did Governors Target Opportunity Zones to
Disinvested Communities?, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST., TAX POL’Y CTR. (May
22,
2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/did-governors-target-opportunity-zones-disin
vested-communities [https://perma.cc/G4MT-Z4UP].
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 9.
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2026.62 The Deferral Benefit also provides a basis step-up: if the
investor leaves the funds in an OZFund for a minimum of five years,
she is granted a 10% basis-step up. If she leaves the funds in an
OZFund for a period of seven years, she is granted an additional 5%
basis-step up.63 Put another way, if an investor takes full advantage of
the Deferral Benefit, she will ultimately pay capital gains taxes on
only 85% of the underlying gain.
The Exclusion Benefit exempts the investor from paying any
capital gains tax at all on the investment in the OZFund entirely (the
“new gain”) if she holds that investment for a minimum of ten years.64
Due to the total absolution of capital gains liability, commentators
have observed that the Exclusion Benefit is potentially worth
substantially more to investors over time than the Deferral Benefit.65

iv. Opportunity Zone Funds
OZFunds are the vehicle by which investors participate in the OZ
program and take advantage of the Deferral and Exclusion Benefits.
The enabling language in the TCJA requires that OZFunds invest
directly in “qualified opportunity zone property” (OZProperty), or

62. Or the sale date — whichever is earlier. Id.
63. Opportunity Zones: A New Tool for Community Development,
NOVOGRADAC
1
(2018),
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/novogradac_opportunity_zones
_fact_sheet_121318.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8BE-V9EU] (“A taxpayer who recognizes
a gain from the sale of stock can invest the gain in an opportunity fund and postpone
taxes on those gains until 2026. If the taxpayer holds the fund shares for five years,
there is a 10 percent basis step-up. After seven years, there is another 5 percent basis
step-up.”). For a set of examples illustrating the two benefits, see Christopher
Karachale, Qualified Opportunity Funds: Deferral and Exclusion Possibilities for
Investors, 46 REAL EST. TAX’N, 39, 39 (2019).
64. About
Opportunity
Zones,
NOVOGRADAC,
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zone-resource-center/about-o
pportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/V2EP-7VJU] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020)
(“Furthermore, as an additional incentive to make long-term, patient capital
investments, taxpayer’s holding Opportunity Fund investments for a period of at least
10 years are exempt from any additional gains beyond that which was previously
deferred.”). As a technical matter, the Exclusion Benefit works in this way: “[T]he
basis of some or all of the taxpayer’s interest in the OZFund will be treated as equal
to the fair market value of such interest on the date that the interest in the OZFund is
sold or exchanged. Thus, no gain (‘New Gain’) will be realized on that sale or
exchange.” Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 10.
65. Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 10 (“The second, and in our view
potentially far more valuable, tax benefit . . . .”).
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indirectly
in
“qualified
opportunity
zone
businesses”
66
(OZBusinesses). The definitions of these terms are analogous:
A qualified opportunity zone business . . . is defined as a trade or
business in which substantially all of the tangible property owned or
leased by the business is OZProperty, substituting the term
‘qualified opportunity zone business’ for the term ‘qualified
opportunity fund’ each place it appears in the definition of
OZProperty.67

v. Proposed Rulemaking and Commentary
The TCJA tasked the IRS with promulgating rules governing the
OZ program. The agency issued several rounds of proposed rules,
and then a set of final rules in December 2019.68 One of the most
crucial rules is the 90% Qualifying Assets Test, which governs the
percentage of OZFund assets required to be invested in eligible
assets. As written, the rule is much more lenient towards indirect
OZFund investments, in other words, investments into
OZBusinesses, than to the direct purchase of OZProperty: the rule
obligates OZFunds to hold 90% of their assets in qualifying
investments, but OZBusinesses are subject to a 70% tangible property
test.69
This disparity, some observers have argued, is cause for genuine
concern since it may blunt the overall effectiveness of the initiative. It
invites OZFund managers to hold 90% of the fund’s assets in either
stock or other ownership interest in OZBusinesses, which in turn hold
only 70% of their assets in qualifying property.70 At bottom, then, an
66. See id. This is defined as either “OZStock . . . OZInterests . . . or
OZProperty.” Id. The accounting firm Novogradac drew up a chart explaining these
possible investment structures. See Opportunity Zones: A New Tool for Community
Development, supra note 63, at 3.
67. Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 11.
68. Lisa Zarlenga, et al., Final Opportunity Zone Regulations Provide Some
Much-Needed
Clarity,
STEPTOE
(Dec.
27,
2019),
https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/final-opportunity-zone-regulations-pr
ovide-some-much-needed-clarity.html [https://perma.cc/J42H-UX9D].
69. John Schrier, et al., Qualified Opportunity Zone Funds: Structuring and
Implementing Tax-Advantaged Fund Transactions, MAYER BROWN 12 (Apr. 22,
2019),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectives-events/events/2019/04/qualifi
edopportunityzonefundspresentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VY3-AVUN].
70. Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 14. Practically speaking, this allows an
OZFund to hold substantial percentages of its assets outside of OZs by using the
intermediary of investing in OZBusinesses. See also Schrier, supra note 69, at 18
(explaining that an OZFund with $10 million in assets could hold only $6.3 million
inside an OZ by “investing $9 million in a partnership and having the partnership
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OZFund seeking to take full advantage of this proposed rule can hold
only 63% of its assets in an OZ.71
Observers have also criticized the IRS’s penalties for failure to
meet these benchmarks. The law imposes a penalty on OZFunds that
fail to meet the percentage thresholds described above.72 However,
as codified in the rules, while noncompliant funds are charged a fee
for each month they fail to meet the required investment thresholds,
and the proposed penalty diminishes the value of the Deferral Benefit
with time, these funds do not lose the ability to take the Exclusion
Benefit after the ten-year investment period.73
In view of the weaknesses of both the enabling legislation and the
IRS’s final rules, the abuse potential of the OZ program is clear: not
only has the federal government failed to put in place meaningful
guardrails to channel capital, but also it has constructed a regulatory
regime which allows investors to claim the core benefit of the

invest $6.3 million (i.e., 70% of its assets) in qualified opportunity zone business
property,” and then holding onto the remainder in cash and investing it in other
investment vehicles. By contrast, if the fund buys OZProperty directly, “it would
have to buy $9 million of qualified opportunity zone business property, all of which
would have to constitute tangible assets”).
71. Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 14.
72. See generally Lydia O’Neal, Opportunity Zone Rules Leave out Data
Reporting,
Penalty
Details,
BLOOMBERG
TAX
(Apr.
22,
2019),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/opportunity-zone-rules-leave-out-dat
a-reporting-penalty-details [https://perma.cc/Z8HH-5EYJ].
73. See Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 16 (“The penalty is calculated based
on the excess of 90% of the amount of the assets in the OZFund over the aggregate
amount of the ‘qualified opportunity zone property’ held by the OZFund, multiplied
by the underpayment rate established under the IRC for such month. This penalty, in
effect, chips away at the Deferral Benefit until December 31, 2026, but does nothing
to mitigate or take away the Exclusion Benefit. By the standards of penalty
provisions in the IRC, this one is particularly gentle, as the currently applicable
interest rate under Section 6621(a)(2) is about 6.0% per annum.”). A final concern
covered in the piece is the “working capital rule” included in the proposed rules:
With respect to the temporal aspect relating to an entity’s holding period for
OZProperty, the issue is how the test will be applied when the entity does
not have existing operations or assets when the OZFund invests, but intends
to use OZFund capital to fund operations or acquire assets. The Proposed
Regulations take much of the pressure off of this issue by providing a
‘working capital’ rule modeled after Section 1397C(e)(1), permitting an
OZFund that is developing a new business or constructing or rehabilitating
real estate (or the entity representing an issuer of OZStock or OZInterests)
to deploy its capital over a 31-month period provided that it has: (a) a
written plan to utilize capital to create OZProperty; (b) establishes a written
schedule of how the capital will be deployed in pursuit of this end, (c) and
adheres to the plan and schedule.
Id. at 14–15.
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initiative while, at times, investing barely over half of the capital in
their OZFunds in actual OZs by using an intermediary.
II. THE DANGER OF UNCONSTRAINED CAPITAL AND THE TENSION
BETWEEN PLACE-BASED AND PERSON-BASED PROGRAMS

Essential to the debate over the efficacy of OZs is a distinction
between economic development programs that target “distressed
communities” and those that target “distressed people” — in other
words, between what scholars term “place-based” programs (the
former) and “person-based” programs (the latter).74 Both styles of
the initiative have defenders and detractors. In recent years,
place-based programs have been a particular lightning rod in the
economic development literature.
Advocates for place-based
programs argue, variously, that “large, place-making developments
can help revitalize low-income areas,” or that “the collection of
neighborhoods making up an inner city are an ideal sub-region for a
place-based approach.”75 Critics respond that place-based programs
ignore the “corporate and political forces that create economic
inequality and widespread poverty,” and that while “American
workers today face declining job security and dwindling earnings as
companies downsize, move overseas, and shift more jobs to part-time
workers,” place-based programs “cannot address these major
trends.”76
74. Randall Crane & Michael Manville, People or Place?: Revisiting the Who
versus the Where of Urban Development, LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y 2 (July 2008),

https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/articl
e-crane-manville.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2SF-R9SG].
75. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & PUB. POLICY, SOL PRICE CTR. FOR SOC.
INNOVATION, PLACE-BASED INITIATIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC POLICY AND
MARKETS:
MOVING
TO
HIGHER
GROUND
3
(2015),
https://socialinnovation.usc.edu/files/2014/12/Prioritizing-Place-Moving-to-Higher-Gr
ound.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2YT-LPQ3].
76. Peter Dreier, Philanthropy’s Misguided Ideas for Fixing Ghetto Poverty: The
Limits of Free Markets and Place-Based Initiatives, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 19, 2015),
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/philanthropy-ideas-for-fixing-ghetto-poverty-the-limits
-of-free-markets-and-place-based-initiatives/
[https://perma.cc/GRM7-LDYU]
(“American workers today face declining job security and dwindling earnings as
companies downsize, move overseas, and shift more jobs to part-time workers . . . .
As indicated above, place-based policies cannot on their own address the major
trends that have led to widening inequality, a decline in the overall standard of living
for most Americans, and an increase in poverty.”). For an analysis of why the efficacy
of place-based programs is challenging to measure, see AUSTIN NICHOLS, URBAN
INST., EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY-WIDE INTERVENTIONS 1 (2013),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23766/412855-Evaluation-of-Co
mmunity-Wide-Interventions.PDF
[https://perma.cc/5YCA-98YR].
Professor
Michelle Layser has been similarly pointed in her criticism of place-based programs:
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As a place-based initiative, the OZ program finds itself squarely at
the center of this debate. In relevant ways, it is similar to the
place-based initiatives that preceded it at the federal and state levels,
including national programs like Empowerment Zones (EZs) and the
Renewal Communities (RC) project which succeeded it,77 as well as
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the New Markets Tax
Credit (NMTC), and state Enterprise Zones.78 Like NMTCs, for
example, OZs require investing in a pre-selected geographical area
for a preset length of time. However, one crucial difference between
the OZ initiative and its intellectual grandparents is the absence of a
competitive process and the comparatively skeletal federal regulatory
regime. The LIHTC and the NMTC are competitive grant programs:
state housing finance agencies, or HFAs (for LIHTC), and the
Department of the Treasury (for NMTC) evaluate applications and

“In sum, spatially oriented investment tax incentives are the dominant form of
place-based investment tax incentives under current law. This is true despite a lack of
empirical evidence to suggest that such tax laws help poor communities, even though
their proponents claim that helping poor communities is an important goal.” Michelle
Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives
and a Path toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745, 771 (2019).
77. Community
Partners,
LOC.
INITIATIVES
SUPPORT
CORP.,
https://www.lisc.org/opportunity-zones/community-partners-playbook/introduction/
[https://perma.cc/5VK3-DYZQ] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (“Opportunity Zones are
certainly not the first tax incentives for investments in distressed communities. The
Empowerment Zone (EZ) program, created in 1993, enabled businesses located in
low-income communities selected by HUD and USDA to claim certain tax benefits.
In competitions held in 1994 and 1998, HUD selected 30 different urban EZs, and the
USDA selected 10 rural EZs. In 2000, Congress created the Renewal Communities
(RCs) program to replace the Empowerment Zone program, and in 2001 HUD
selected 40 RCs, 28 in urban areas and 12 in rural areas. While HUD and the USDA
are no longer designating new EZs and RCs, businesses operating in those
communities can continue to claim certain tax benefits.”).
78. Id. (“In 2000, in the same legislation that authorized the Renewal
Communities program, Congress enacted the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC)
program. Under this program, investors can claim tax credits for investing in
Treasury-certified Community Development Entities (CDEs), which in turn provide
loans and investments to businesses and real estate projects in low-income
communities. The investor may claim tax credits valued at 39% of the total
investment in the CDE, phased in over a seven-year holding period. The total tax
credit allocation authority is currently capped at $3.5 billion annually, meaning that
CDEs must apply to the Treasury Department for the authority to issue tax credits to
their investors.”). Place-based incentives have been launched by states as well. See,
Urban
Enterprise
Program,
NJ.GOV,
e.g.,
https://www.nj.gov/njbusiness/financing/uez/ [https://perma.cc/M3R9-5ULW] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2020). There is evidence that state-based programs are effective at
sparking job creation. See, e.g., Stephen B. Billings, Do Enterprise Zones Work?: An
Analysis at the Borders, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 68 (2008).
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decide which proposals to approve.79 The LIHTC application process
is particularly exacting, involving multiple layers of safeguards with
restrictions imposed by both the federal government and the states.80
State HFAs have the ability to set extended affordability
requirements, establish that certain kinds of projects — like
permanent supportive housing or housing for senior citizens — are
state priorities, geographically restrict the grant of tax credits, and
incentivize the use of companies owned by minorities or women.81 By
contrast, OZs are far less regulated: “With the opportunity zones
incentive, any eligible taxpayer — individuals or corporations — can
make investments funded by realized gains in opportunity funds.
There is no cap.”82
Even a robust regulatory program undergirding a place-based
incentive is no guarantee of unmitigated success. Since their
inception, the LIHTC and the NMTC have both attracted their fair
share of detractors. For instance, critics have argued that the LIHTC,
though extremely expensive for the federal government, is ineffective
at generating long-term affordability, or that the NMTC ends up
benefitting residents of higher-income neighborhoods who commute

79. Opportunity Zones: A New Tool for Community Development, supra note
63, at 1–2.
80. See, e.g., CORIANNE PAYTON SCALLY, ET AL., URBAN INST., THE LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT: HOW IT WORKS AND WHO IT SERVES 3 (2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98758/lithc_how_it_works_and_
who_it_serves_final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G4Q-PPTK] (“The 9 [LIHTC] percent
credits are allocated to states annually by the IRS to distribute to eligible projects
through a competitive process through state housing finance agencies. Award criteria
are updated each year through a state’s Qualified Allocation Plan, which outlines the
state’s priorities and scoring criteria.”).
81. Id. at 4 (“The 9 percent credits are highly competitive, with many more
projects requesting credits than can be funded. Because developers have strong
incentives to score the most points possible, the preferences spelled out in a state’s
Qualified Allocation Plan have a powerful ability to shape the type and location of
housing built.”). To take one example, the New York State HFA established the
development of supportive housing and senior citizen housing as goals. See 2019

Mission Statement for the New York State Housing Finance Agency & Its Subsidiary
the New York State Affordable Housing Corporation, N.Y. ST., HOMES &

COMMUNITY
RENEWAL
(2019),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/04/2019-hfa-mission-statementdocx.pd
f [https://perma.cc/85HN-VBKN]. New York State also has goals to promote equity
through its Minority and Women Owned Business Enterprise (M/WBE) program.
See, e.g., Minority and Women-Owned Business Enterprise Compliance, N.Y. ST.
EDUC.
DEP’T.,
http://www.archives.nysed.gov/grants/lgrmif-mwbe-compliance
[https://perma.cc/P5MD-YDRX] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
82. Opportunity Zones: A New Tool for Community Development, supra note
63, at 2.
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to targeted areas.83 There is also a concern that place-based
initiatives, even when tightly regulated, can either cause or accelerate
gentrification and displacement.84
These concerns are amplified for the OZ program. The differences
between OZs and other place-based initiatives highlight a central
challenge: the deployment of unconstrained capital with almost no
federal guardrails directing it. This is perhaps the central roadblock
to OZs achieving their stated aim of addressing poverty. There is, for
instance, no requirement in the program that projects claiming OZ
benefits create any jobs at all, let alone for poor workers.85 There is
no obligation for OZ investors to build affordable housing that is
accessible to longtime residents of neighborhoods designated as
OZs.86 In fact, there are no federal safeguards at all to ensure that
communities have any say over how and where capital is invested.87
83. Urban Institute Evaluates the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, NAT’L LOW
INCOME
HOUSING
COALITION
(July
23,
2018),
https://nlihc.org/resource/urban-institute-evaluates-low-income-housing-tax-credit
[https://perma.cc/6JVG-C4AY] (“Despite its popularity, LIHTC falls short in several
critical areas. First, LIHTC investment does not permanently address affordability
problems — properties are only required to be affordable for up to 30 years. The
report cites an NLIHC estimate that more than 115,000 units could expire in the next
five years. Additionally, LIHTC properties have struggled to meet the needs of
extremely low-income renters (those earning below the federal poverty level or 30%
of the area median income, whichever is greater) without additional federal rental
assistance. The lengthy and complicated tax credit allocation process is also
inefficient, and projects have few incentives to bring down costs.”); see also Matthew
Freedman, Place-Based Programs and the Geographic Dispersion of Employment, 53
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 1, 1 (2015) (“This paper examines the labor market
impacts of investment subsidized by the U.S. federal government’s New Markets Tax
Credit (NMTC) program, which provides tax incentives to promote business
investment in low-income neighborhoods . . . . I find evidence that many of the new
jobs created in areas that receive subsidized investment do not go to residents of
targeted neighborhoods. The results suggest that the local economic benefits of
place-based programs may be diluted when subsidized businesses have scope to hire
from broader regional labor markets.”).
84. See, e.g., Nathaniel Baum-Snow & Justin Marion, The Effects of Low Income
Housing Tax Credit Developments on Neighborhoods, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 654, 663
(2009) (acknowledging that isolating cause and effect here is challenging, but finding
that “LIHTC developments significantly increase turnover of owner-occupied
households within 1 km”).
85. See Daniel Hemel, A Place for Place in Federal Tax Law, 45 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 525, 533 (2019) (“An enterprise could, for example, acquire an existing factory
in a high-poverty area, fire all the workers, replace them with robots, and still claim
all the opportunity zone tax benefits for its investment.”).
86. Id. (“A developer could buy a building in an opportunity zone currently
occupied by low-income tenants, tear it down, replace it with luxury rentals, and
claim the opportunity zone tax benefits.”).
87. Contrast this with the fact that there is at least some political responsiveness
baked into LIHTC. “Although they vary widely in characteristics such as their
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Professor Michelle Layser has gone so far as to suggest that spurring
gentrification is a feature of the OZ program, and not a bug: “[a]t the
time when the [2017 TCJA] tax law was introduced, the Trump
Administration’s primary focus was on creating a favorable,
pro-growth business environment.”88 The staff of EIG who first
helped to dream up OZs would undoubtedly disagree with that
characterization; regardless of its veracity, however, the most
egregious excesses of the OZ program — especially those highlighted
in the media — tend to be clear examples of this abuse liability.89
III. EARLY ADOPTERS: STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSES TO THE
OPPORTUNITY ZONE INITIATIVE
A. Overview

In the two years since OZs were first enacted into law, researchers,
commentators, and practitioners have written widely about how the
program can be improved by adding guardrails to direct funding to
areas where it is most needed and where it will be least likely to
One of the most
generate gentrification and displacement.90
relationship to state government, most HFAs are independent entities that operate
under the direction of a board of directors appointed by each state’s governor. They
administer a wide range of affordable housing and community development
programs.” About HFAs, NAT’L COUNCIL ST. HOUSING AGENCIES,
https://www.ncsha.org/about-us/about-hfas/ [https://perma.cc/7R45-MQ8H] (last
visited Apr. 4, 2020) (emphasis added).
88. Layser, supra note 76, at 788. She continues:
Given this political context, even some members of the development
community were skeptical of the program’s objectives . . . . This critique of
Opportunity Zones is understandable, given the law’s spatially oriented
form. But the form itself was to be expected. Notwithstanding claims that
the mission of Opportunity Zones is to help poor communities, the context
and design of the new law reflect the same pro-gentrification origins that
underlie the vast majority of place-based investment tax incentives.
Id. at 788–89.
89. See generally Drucker & Lipton, supra note 1.
90. See, e.g., Morgan Simon, What You Need to Know about Opportunity Zones,
(Mar.
30,
2019),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/03/30/what-you-need-to-know-about
-opportunity-zones/#2a7627056ae2 [https://perma.cc/2KSY-T4PB] (drawing a
distinction between “extractive” and “non-extractive” projects: “A non-extractive
OZ project is one where the value created is shared. I’d like to see a good blend of
broad-based ownership for employees and contractors, training and apprenticeships,
and general acknowledgement of existing community efforts. A lot of people are
doing these things, but they are on the margins. We need to ask . . . if a project
generates $100M in profits, where does this money flow? How much of it is left in the
community? I just wanted to call out that a $100M dollar investment with a little bit
of philanthropy wrapped around it and some kind of job fair, that doesn’t really cut
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comprehensive reports is the “Opportunity Zone Playbook” drafted
by the Local Initiative Support Center (LISC), which proposes six
concrete steps that community partners can take to direct streams of
OZ funding:
Step 1: Hold a Stakeholder Meeting/Get the lay of the land, educate
partners about Opportunity Zone policy and engage key players . . .
. Step 2: Embarking on a Plan for Work in the Opportunity
Zones/Assess the terrain, map and support community planning . . . .
Step 3: Incentives and Guardrails in the Opportunity Zones/Tapping
policies and public programs that can help bolster success — and
minimize risks — for communities . . . . Step 4: Collaborating to
Build Pipeline & Leverage Local Expertise/By forging a consortium
or grant programs, or by modeling the financial feasibility of
projects, community partners can begin to kindle Opportunity Zone
projects . . . . Step 5: Ramp Up Your Investor Marketing/Creating a
prospectus, marketing your zone and other strategies for connecting
with investors . . . . Step 6: Develop Impact Metrics & Encourage
Transparency/Rigorous evaluation and accessible reporting are keys
to inclusive and equitable success in the Opportunity Zones.91

Another is the Governance Project’s “Toolkit for Maximizing the
Impact of Opportunity Zones.”92 Across these varied approaches,
it”); see also Prioritizing and Achieving Impact in Opportunity Zones, U.S. IMPACT
INVESTING
ALLIANCE
2,
https://ozframework.org/s/Opportunity-Zones-Reporting-Framework-June-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SCE-HZAF] (last visited May 20, 2020) (arguing that “[w]e are
optimistic about the possibilities that Opportunity Zones and Opportunity Funds
offer to combat economic inequality and barriers facing low-income and
underinvested communities. We also believe that doing so will require focus on these
goals, as well as diligent efforts to avoid unintended outcomes. These principles are
designed to guide stakeholders, of all kinds, as they conceptualize and implement
their Opportunity Zones activities. 1. Community Engagement: Opportunity Fund
investors should request that fund managers integrate the needs of local communities
into the formation and implementation of the funds, reaching low-income and
underinvested communities with attention to diversity. 2. Equity: Opportunity Fund
investments should seek to generate equitable community benefits, leverage other
incentives and aim for responsible exits. 3. Transparency: Opportunity Fund investors
should be transparent and hold themselves accountable, with processes and practices
that remain fair and clear. 4. Measurement: Opportunity Fund investors should
voluntarily monitor, measure and track progress against specific impact objectives,
identifying key outcome measures and allowing for continuous improvement. 5.
Outcomes: Opportunity Fund metrics should track real change, with an
understanding that both quantitative and qualitative measures are valuable indicators
of progress”).
91. See Community Partners, supra note 77.
92. Toolkit for Maximizing the Impact of Opportunity Zones, GOVERNANCE
PROJECT
1–5
(2019),
https://governanceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/TGP_Toolkit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YD25-Q9YV] (“1. Start with a Vision or Prospectus . . . 2. Identify
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common themes have emerged: community participation,
transparency, scale, and impact.93 Since the goal of this Note is not to
suggest criteria by which to measure the success of OZs, I adopt these
four goals as normatively desirable.
The purpose of this Part is to lay out and evaluate a broad
spectrum of state and local government responses to the OZ
initiative. The following Sections analyze the work of three early
adopters: Louisville, Kentucky; Cuyahoga County, Ohio (whose
county seat is the city of Cleveland); and Washington, D.C.
The selection of these three cities and their presentation order is
intentional. They represent a wide range of possible policy responses
to the OZ initiative, from informal to formal policymaking power.
They are also politically, demographically, and geographically varied:
Louisville and Cuyahoga County have Democratic chief executives,94

Zone-Specific Needs . . . 3. Identify Community Resources . . . 4. Select Priority
Projects from the Intersection of Needs & Resources . . . 5. Develop Financing
Models to Refine Priorities . . . 6. Progress Priority Projects into Deals.”); see also
HOWARD WIAL, INITIATIVE FOR A COMPETITIVE INNER CITY, WHAT IT WILL TAKE
FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES TO CREATE REAL OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA’S
ECONOMICALLY
DISTRESSED
AREAS
(2019),
http://icic.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICIC_OZ_PolicyBrief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3S8-XPEU] (discussing other processes and steps for maximizing
the impact of OZ).
93. Commentators have also suggested applying criteria from outside the OZ
literature to guide OZ investment. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, A Better Approach
to Urban Opportunity, 27 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 449, 456
(2019) (arguing that “Dyal-Chand argues convincingly for prioritizing the economic
stability of workers through democratic participation, vocational training focused on
long-term individual growth, and strong wages and benefits. She likewise argues for
businesses to find niches that would allow for multiple bottom-line approaches, tools
for connecting to broader markets and sources of finance, and collaborative
structures to spread risk and leverage management expertise”). For a notable
example of the ways in which community participation can ensure that investment
achieves meaningful results for impacted communities, see Timothy Fields, Jr., A
Dream Realized: Community Driven Revitalization in Spartanburg, EPA BLOG
(Aug.
26,
2014),
https://blog.epa.gov/2014/08/26/a-dream-realized-community-driven-revitalization-inspartanburg/ [https://perma.cc/8NG9-JCQX].
94. See
Mayor
Greg
Fischer,
LOUISVILLEKY.GOV,
https://louisvilleky.gov/government/mayor-greg-fischer [https://perma.cc/P627-79JY]
(last visited Apr. 4, 2020); Office of the Executive, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO,
http://executive.cuyahogacounty.us/ [https://perma.cc/QPL6-N7G5] (last visited Apr.
4, 2020); see also Amina Elahi, Mayor Greg Fischer to Be Inaugurated for Third
WFPL
(June
6,
2019),
Term
Monday,
https://wfpl.org/mayor-greg-fischer-to-be-inaugurated-for-third-term-monday/
[https://perma.cc/HZM9-PGY7]; Mark Naymik, Cuyahoga County Executive
Armond Budish Is Lucky His Opponent Is a Nothingburger, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan.
29,
2019),
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while Republicans dominate the Kentucky and Ohio state
legislatures.95 Because it is not a state and has limited home rule,
Washington, D.C.’s political powers are constrained by the federal
government.96
B. Coordination Problems

Perhaps the single greatest obstacle to using OZs for impact and
returns (as opposed to returns alone) is a coordination problem: the
community of investors with capital gains to deploy does not, in many
instances, overlap with local stakeholders inside of OZs who have the
most knowledge about which projects, if given access to capital, could
create impact.97 Stephanie Copeland, CEO of the Governance
Project, a leading think tank partnering with states and municipalities
across the country to leverage OZs to create impact, phrased it this
way: “Who knows best what communities really need? It’s the local
stakeholders, who are often ill-equipped to attract capital because of

https://www.cleveland.com/naymik/2018/09/cuyahoga_county_executive_armo.html
[https://perma.cc/QF9R-YKCR].
95. See
Kentucky
General
Assembly,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Kentucky_General_Assembly [https://perma.cc/7U8U-QKC4]
(last visited Mar. 16, 2020); Ohio General Assembly, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_General_Assembly [https://perma.cc/WT9R-4URS] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2020) (note that Ohio has a Republican “trifecta”: both houses of its
legislature and its governor’s office is held by a Republican).
96. See
DC
Government
Organization,
OFF.
CITY
ADMIN.,
https://oca.dc.gov/page/dc-government-organization [https://perma.cc/5QZJ-WEZP]
(last visited Mar. 16, 2020) (“The current form of government was established by the
District of Columbia Home Rule Act in 1973. Although local officials have the
authority to pass laws and govern local affairs, the United States Congress maintains
the power to overturn local laws. Furthermore, unlike any other jurisdiction in the
country, residents of the District of Columbia are not represented by voting members
of the United States Congress.”); see also Martin Austermuhle, Four Decades after
Getting Home Rule, the Fight in D.C. Goes On, WAMU 88.5 (Nov. 15, 2013),
https://wamu.org/story/13/11/15/four_decades_on_dc_continues_fighting_for_home_r
ule/ [https://perma.cc/8MA8-26HA].
97. See, e.g., Opportunity Zones Reality Check, LOC. INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP.
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.lisc.org/our-stories/story/opportunity-zones-reality-check
[https://perma.cc/C3UD-QMXV] (“Participants noted that Opportunity Zone
investments take time to structure and close, and require careful coordination with

local stakeholders to ensure that community needs are met. Opportunity Zone
funding might gravitate toward areas where development would have happened
anyway, and one challenge would be how to direct funding to places where it would
not have gone otherwise. Still, many investors may be looking to deploy capital by

the end of this year in order to gain the full tax benefits of the program.” (emphasis
added)).
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structural disadvantages.”98
Another factor compounding this
challenge is the reality that “capital tends to follow very hard paths”
with “very specific ways of underwriting risk.”99 This Note concludes
with an analysis of tools adopted across these three cities; however, as
a threshold matter, the many practitioners I interviewed for this Note
all agreed that solving this basic coordination problem is crucial to
making the OZ program work on the ground.
C. Case Studies

i. Louisville, KY
On a spectrum of government action directing OZ investment,
where one end represents the exercise of informal government power
(through networking and agenda-setting) and the other end
represents the exercise of formal government power (through official
actions of the chief executive or the legislature), Louisville firmly
represents the “informal” end of the spectrum.
Louisville Mayor Greg Fischer was an early proponent of the OZ
initiative: many of the first law journal articles analyzing the program
specifically mentioned him as an early adopter.100 In a late-2018
op-ed in the Louisville Courier Journal, Mayor Fischer himself wrote
that:
As a former entrepreneur, I know that one of the biggest challenges
that start-up businesses face is equitable access to capital . . . . We
want responsible development and projects that benefit our citizens
by providing investment without displacement . . . . If we use any
local incentives, we will look for Opportunity Funds that would

98. Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, CEO, Governance Project
(Dec. 13, 2019).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Diane Lupke, Opportunity Zones: A Different Zone Opportunity, J.
TAX’N 24, 44 (2019) (“In Louisville, Mayor Greg Fischer praised Opportunity Zones
for attracting investment in a major business expansion . . . . One of the first
Louisville investors to take advantage of the recently designated Opportunity Zone is
the Marion [sic] Group through its spin-off and expansion of Blacksmith Iron Works,
a fabrication and custom metal solutions business that recently moved into a 20,000
square-foot facility at 3100 Vermont Avenue in the Russell neighborhood.”); see also
Kriston Capps, The Obscure Tax Program That Promises to Undo America’s
Geographic
Inequality,
CITYLAB
(Apr.
25,
2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/can-opportunity-zones-save-the-country/5582
66/ [https://perma.cc/C9GK-EJY3] (“In Louisville, for example, that might mean
turning an under-used high school into a vocational training facility. That’s one idea
for an investment opportunity in Louisville’s historically black, near-downtown
neighborhood of Russell.”).
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make a social impact by hiring and partnering with local residents
who can also benefit from any income and wealth that is created.101

Mayor Fischer’s desire to attract capital makes sense in the context
of economic conditions in his city: several months before his op-ed
ran in the Louisville Courier Journal, the paper reported the results
of a study from the Greater Louisville Project showing that one in
five children in the city live in poverty, and that its poverty level cost
the city $200 million each year in lost economic growth.102
Around the same time that Louisville was looking to attract OZ
investment, the nonprofit Accelerator for America (AFA) worked
with local government expert Bruce Katz and his New Localism
Advisors team to create “a replicable product — an Investment
Prospectus — to enable cities, counties, and states to communicate
their competitive advantages, trigger local partnerships, and identify
sound projects that are ready for public, private, and civic capital.”103
Louisville jumped at the chance to work with Katz and AFA: they
enlisted Katz to work with economic development staff like Mary
Ellen Wiederwohl, Chief of Louisville Forward (the city’s economic
development arm) and Senior Policy Advisor Eric Burnette, and to
draft a version of the prospectus that AFA envisioned.104
The result was a document called the “Louisville Opportunity
Zone Prospectus: A Platform for Action.”105 The prospectus is now
on its second iteration: the original version was nearly 50 pages long
and is essentially a sophisticated pitch deck aiming to connect
investors to the city. The document’s executive summary lays out, in

101. Greg Fischer, The City of Louisville Is Harnessing Opportunity Zones,
J.
(Nov.
7,
2018),
COURIER
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/contributors/2018/11/07/louisville-harn
essing-opportunity-zones/1863466002/ [https://perma.cc/K6QM-KM2U].
102. Phillip M. Bailey, 1 in 5 Louisville Kids Lives in Poverty and a Report Says
COURIER
J.
(Apr.
10,
2018),
It’s
Holding
the
City
Back,
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2018/04/10/child-poverty-louisville-r
eport-2018/502214002/ [https://perma.cc/4SGL-JCEY].
103. BRUCE KATZ & KEN GROSS, ACCELERATOR FOR AM., INVESTMENT
PROSPECTUS GUIDE: A HOW-TO FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES 1, 3 (2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d9f9365f67b454b1ce2dc2f/t/5e38ae218a999b24
d895fe2e/1580772908835/New+AFA+Prospectus+Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N23K-3E5L].
104. Telephone Interview with Eric Burnette, Senior Policy Advisor, Louisville
Forward (Nov. 20, 2019).
105. ACCELERATOR FOR AM., LOUISVILLE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PROSPECTUS: A
PLATFORM FOR ACTION (2018) [hereinafter LOUISVILLE OPPORTUNITY ZONE
PROSPECTUS],
https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/files/louisville_forward/louisville_prospectus_vers
ion_13_11.5.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9YU-SHQ5].
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brief, Louisville’s argument for why investors should inject capital
there: it is an expanding city, with a diverse and growing economy,
whose OZs were chosen “intentionally” to “maximize the impact of
Opportunity Zone investment.”106
The pages that follow the summary give an overview of how the
OZ program functions and explain Louisville’s assets in greater detail
(with a focus on demographics and major industries). But the heart
of the document is a neighborhood-by-neighborhood breakdown of
Louisville’s opportunity zones — with specific projects detailed on
subsequent slides. Each project slide explains the neighborhood’s
assets, as well as tailor-made investment opportunities for investors to
consider. These slides also include maps (termed “mental maps” by
AFA), which show the various OZs, as well as “land use” and other
“assets.”107 As an example, slide 29, titled “Central Business District
Catalytic Investment: Louisville Gardens,” describes a “[c]ity-owned,
historic 6,000-seat performance venue,” which is “[p]rimed for
restoration as an arts and entertainment venue, convention facility,
and mixed-use space, at an estimated cost of $65 million,” and is
“[l]ocated in the heart of downtown” near “10 new downtown hotels
since 2009.”108 Immediately underneath this information, a box titled
“The Opportunity” gives investors the hard sell: “City seeking
development partner to create a new mixed-use facility” and “City
offering other incentives and land.”109
Louisville Forward released version two of the prospectus in late
November 2019. Like its predecessor, this new version begins with an
overview of the city’s assets and makes a clear argument for investors
to deploy capital there.110 However, unlike version one, version two
of the pitch deck includes an entire category of possible projects
called “Projects with a High Social Return” in a section called
“Louisville Priorities.”111 The deck identifies four types of such
projects: “[s]mall businesses and start-ups,” “[a]ffordable housing,”

106. Id. at 2.
107. See id. at 6. This map was later made available as a standalone product.
Opportunity
Zones
—
Public,
ARCGIS,
https://www.arcgis.com/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=0d58a1018f4d46f8a0896
cb1204960ec (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
108. LOUISVILLE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PROSPECTUS, supra note 105, at 29.
109. Id.
110. See generally ACCELERATOR FOR AM., LOUISVILLE OPPORTUNITY ZONE
DEAL
BOOK
(2019),
https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/files/louisville_forward/louisville_oz_deal_book_
11.26.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/V787-Z8WD].
111. Id. at 12–13.
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“[c]ommunity spaces and surrounding commercial uses,” and “[f]ocus
It also pitches specific projects already in the
on tech.”112
development pipeline, which are looking to attract additional
investment — like a company called “Weather Check,” a
black-owned business located in an OZ and part of the Y-Combinator
incubation program in 2019.113
In addition to drafting and releasing this pitch book, Louisville
Forward has used the city’s informal power to attract investment in
other ways. It, for instance, established a relationship with OneWest,
a nonprofit development company, which purchased a large plot of
land in the city with plans to develop it.114 Additionally, the city
partnered with the Louisville Urban League to help fund the
construction of a large athletic facility called the “Track on Ali,”
located in an OZ.115
Finally, Louisville worked extensively with the Governance Project
to develop a ready-made “plug-and-play” tool that will allow public
officials to identify socially impactful OZ projects and then build out
the kind of projections and deal documents which investors require
when weighing the attractiveness of a potential investment.116 The
tool, which is sponsored by the MasterCard Center for Inclusive
Growth, is named GroundUp; Governance Project’s CEO Stephanie
Copeland describes it as “Turbo Tax for Opportunity Zone deals”:
“[I]t asks a set of questions about the deal, and then auto-generates
many essential deal documents.”117 The value of this sort of tool is its
bridging of the gap between two communities whose partnership is
essential for using OZs for impact: investors and public officials.
Since “a big part of community development is figuring out the
financing structure, this tool will give public officials more of an active
voice in conversations with the investment community, in terms that
investors are familiar with.”118
Louisville’s work to attract and funnel OZ investment has been
constrained in two senses. The first is that Kentucky, under
now-former Governor Matt Bevin, was largely unwilling to extend

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98.
Id.
Id.
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additional funding to incentivize investment.119 While some states
have proposed layering additional tax incentives on top of the OZ
program, Kentucky has not yet adopted that approach.120
Additionally, as the consequence of a decision made by the Kentucky
Retirement Systems Board, which manages the state’s public
employee pension system, Louisville faces an increased pension
obligation which amounts to “a looming budget hole over the next
As a
four years that will grow to roughly $65 million.”121
consequence, Louisville is unable to offer any additional economic
incentives to OZ investors — which it might not have done even in an
alternate fiscal reality in which its pension obligation had been
lower.122

ii. Cuyahoga County, Ohio and National Work by the Kresge
Foundation
One of the most demanding policy regimes developed so far to
govern capital flows in the OZ space was created by the philanthropic
sector and not by government. In May 2019, the Detroit-based
Kresge Foundation announced a $22 million investment, with
substantial restrictions, into two OZFunds: Arctaris Impact (based in
Boston, Massachusetts) and Community Capital Management (based
in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida).123 These two funds were, according to the
foundation, the first in the country to agree to “voluntary reporting,

119. See Telephone Interview with Eric Burnette, supra note 104. Although,
concededly, it was one of the first 18 states to have its OZs certified. See Press
Release, Team KY, Cabinet for Econ. Dev., Gov. Bevin: Kentucky Opportunity
Zone Initiative Holds Promise of Economic Growth for Local Communities (Apr. 9,
2018),
http://thinkkentucky.com/newsroom/NewsPage.aspx?x=04092018_Opportunity_Zone
s.html [https://perma.cc/WV6S-LV9T].
120. See 2020 State Opportunity Zones Legislation, NOVOGRADAC,
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zones-resource-center/state-o
pportunity-zones-legislation [https://perma.cc/9NFX-97WZ] (last visited Mar. 22,
2020).
121. Darcy Costello, Bevin to Louisville Mayor: How Could You Be ‘Oblivious’ to
Pension
Problem,
COURIER
J.
(Feb.
13,
2019),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/metro-government/2019/02/13/ke
ntucky-governor-bevin-calls-louisville-mayor-greg-fischer-oblivious-to-pension-probl
em/2859359002/ [https://perma.cc/9FT4-LP5U].
122. See Telephone Interview with Eric Burnette, supra note 104.
123. Press Release, The Kresge Found., Kresge Foundation Commits $22M to
Back Arctaris, Community Capital Management Opportunity Zone Funds (Mar. 18,
2019)
[hereinafter
Kresge
Foundation
Press
Release],
https://kresge.org/news/kresge-foundation-commits-22m-back-arctaris-community-ca
pital-management-opportunity-zone-funds [https://perma.cc/5H2N-LFPE] .
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metrics and transparency measures.”124 Kresge and its staff chose to
focus on OZ investing, particularly because of a perceived gap in
regulation from government actors:
[W]hen public policy has a gap . . . there’s a moment for
philanthropy to really do its job. That’s what we have tried to do
with Opportunity Zones, and we hope others in the philanthropic
community will find unique ways to do the same in Opportunity
Zones and in other places.125

Much of Kresge’s funding comes in the form of an investment
structure called principal protection, or “catalytic first loss capital”
(CFLC).126 Under this relationship, the Foundation will provide a
kind of insurance to the investors in the OZFund, a guarantee that
Kresge will bear the first losses — up to a certain threshold — if
investments decline in value. The Global Impact Investing Network
defines the concept this way: “CFLC aims to channel commercial
capital towards the achievement of certain social and/or
environmental outcomes . . . . [G]rants and guarantees provided
expressly as CFLC are distinct because they always take the first loss .
. . in the event of losses.”127

124. Id.
125. Joshua Pollard, Driving Social Impact: 1-On-1 with Kresge Foundation on
Opportunity
Zones,
FORBES
(June
7,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuapollard/2019/06/07/driving-social-impact-1-on-1-w
ith-kresge-foundation-on-opportunity-zones/#2880db4e6f9a
[https://perma.cc/ZHD6-HYXF].
126. See Kresge Foundation Press Release, supra note 123.
127. GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, CATALYTIC FIRST LOSS CAPITAL: ISSUE
BRIEF
5
(2013)
[hereinafter
CATALYTIC
ISSUE
BRIEF],
https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/pub/CatalyticFirstLossCapital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K459-JN5T]. The Global Impact Investing Network has identified
several possible benefits of catalytic first loss capital.
(1) Impact acceleration: By offering CFLC, Providers can typically attract
greater amounts of capital towards a targeted impact than they could
aggregate by utilizing their own funds alone, thus multiplying the scale of
impact many-fold. (2) Resource optimization: By incenting commercial
investors to explore a new market, providers can potentially demonstrate
the market’s long-term commercial viability, encouraging investors to
continue to invest without credit enhancement. This allows Providers to
channel their scarce resources towards issues and areas where the market
case is not yet proven.
(3) Better terms for Investees: By reducing the risk for Recipients, and by
fostering greater competition in new financial markets, Providers can enable
improved terms — such as lower cost of capital — for end Investees that are
working on addressing important social and/or environmental problems.
Id. at 7.
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Principal protection/CFLC is a form of credit enhancement — in
the same family as letters of credit from a bank used on an
LIHTC-funded affordable housing transaction or a Small Business
It is often provided by
Administration loan guarantee.128
philanthropic organizations or governments as a means of attracting
capital from investors who would otherwise perceive deals as too
risky due to “a lack of information or track record given the novelty
of either the market or a particular type of investment
opportunity.”129
For OZFunds like Arctaris, CFLC is more valuable than other
incentives because of the funds’ focus on investment in growth or
mid-stage investing in businesses rather than investment in real
estate.130 State-level economic incentives like tax increment financing
(TIF) or local incentives like accelerated zoning approval are far less
important to OZFunds whose investments are not real
estate-based.131 In this instance, the Kresge Foundation has agreed
that its contribution will insure a certain percentage of these two
funds’ investments in OZs around the country.
In return for this commitment, the OZFunds have agreed to abide
by a strict set of criteria — far beyond the requirements established in
the OZ legislation — which are codified as covenants.132 The first
metric Arctaris agreed to meet relates to scale: for every dollar of
insurance provided by the Kresge Foundation, the fund has
committed to raising $9 of additional capital.133 The logic underlying

128. Id. at 3.
129. Id.
130. Interview with Jonathan Tower, CEO, Arctaris (Dec. 15, 2019. This was, after
all, the original intent of the OZ program. See, e.g., Sophie Quinton, So Far, Real
Estate Dominates a Tax Break Meant for Businesses, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (June
12,
2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/06/12/so-far-r
eal-estate-dominates-a-tax-break-meant-for-businesses
[https://perma.cc/NH9U-QN4W] (pointing out that “[t]he incentive ‘will unlock new
private investment for communities where millions of Americans face the crisis of
closing business, lack of access to capital and declining entrepreneurship,’ said a
bipartisan congressional group — Sens. Tim Scott, a South Carolina Republican, and
Cory Booker, a New Jersey Democrat, and Reps. Pat Tiberi, an Ohio Republican,
and Ron Kind, a Wisconsin Democrat — in announcing the idea”).
131. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98.
132. Press Release, The Kresge Found., supra note 123 (“In the absence of a
regulatory mandate, Arctaris and CCM have committed to making investments that
reflect the stated social and community goals of the Opportunity Zones program and
address unmet needs in under-resourced communities.”).
133. Interview with Jonathan Tower, supra note 130; see also Press Release, The
Kresge Found., supra note 123 (“Leveraging the Kresge guarantee, Arctaris plans to
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this requirement is that the foundation wants to ensure that its
investment would be paired with significant capital from the fund to
reach as broad a scale as possible.
The second is an impact requirement. Arctaris has committed to
making investments that are beneficial for neighborhoods: prioritizing
affordable housing, “pathways to prosperity for residents of
low-income communities,” and “investments in operating businesses
that create quality jobs” — and also to forming “community advisory
boards similar to those in the New Markets Tax Credit Program.”134
Third, Arctaris has committed to avoid net-negative investments,
like those that create displacement, or non-productive investments,
like self-storage facilities.135 Finally, Arctaris has agreed to a set of
transparency requirements, most notably, measuring and then
disclosing the number of jobs created in each census tract by its
investments.136
These principles are generally aligned with the U.S. Impact
Investing Alliance framework referenced above. They also reflect the
Kresge Foundation’s belief that since “the underlying legislation was
passed without minimum transparency or reporting guidelines,” OZs
present a “ripe opportunity for misuse.”137 Arctaris views this
investment from Kresge as having the potential to turbocharge its
work: to create an “exponential” impact by demonstrating to other
foundations, municipalities, counties, and states that this kind of
investment is worth making. It also views the restrictions as very
stringent: Jonathan Tower, Arctaris’s CEO, explained that these
covenants will not disincentivize investment (otherwise the fund
would never have agreed to them in the first place), but they do
demarcate the outer boundary of the kind of “strings attached” that
the fund would have accepted in exchange for CFLC.138

launch a principal-protected Opportunity Zone fund with more than $500 million in
initial capitalization from U.S. commercial banks, institutional investors, and family
offices. Supplementing Kresge’s catalytic support, Arctaris expects to secure
additional guarantees and grants from other foundations and state government
economic development agencies. The Fund will make growth equity investments in
small- to medium-sized enterprises involved in manufacturing, renewable energy, and
telecom, as well as real estate infrastructure.”).
134. Interview with Jonathan Tower, supra note 130; see Press Release, The
Kresge Found., supra note 123.
135. Press Release, The Kresge Found., supra note 123.
136. Interview with Jonathan Tower, supra note 130.
137. Press Release, The Kresge Found., supra note 123; see also Pollard, supra
note 126.
138. Interview with Jonathan Tower, supra note 130.
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One region which has followed the Kresge Foundation’s lead is
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, home to the city of Cleveland. Even before
the Kresge Foundation named Arctaris a winner of its national OZ
competition, the greater Cleveland area had already sought to market
itself as an attractive destination for OZ investment and to channel
that investment toward socially beneficial purposes, such as “jobs,
training, education, quality affordable housing, increased access to
broadband,
public
transportation
and
healthy-living
environments.”139 In March 2019, the City of Cleveland and
Cuyahoga County, in partnership with a collection of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), established an initiative
called “Opportunity CLE” as the region’s main vehicle for generating
and funneling OZ investment toward the 64 OZs across the county.140
The initiative acknowledged in early press coverage that the OZ
program is at risk of being abused — of becoming a “National
Gentrification Fund.”141 In response, Opportunity CLE has taken a
number of steps to restrict capital flows — first in the form of
informal policymaking and networking. For instance, Opportunity
CLE built and released a pitch deck similar to that of Louisville and
seeks to connect investors with entrepreneurs eager for access to
capital.142 In partnership with the Urban Institute, the initiative is

139. Jordyn Grezelewski, ‘The Floodgates Are about to Open’: Cuyahoga County,
Cleveland Leaders Unveil Opportunity-Zone Plan, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2019/03/the-floodgates-are-about-to-open-cuyahoga
-county-cleveland-leaders-unveil-opportunity-zone-plan.html
[https://perma.cc/XK9X-SNKV].
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
The first step is marketing the region, members said. The investment
prospectus released Thursday pitches Greater Cleveland as a place where
investment dollars can stretch further than they would elsewhere. The
prospectus includes sections on each of the 11 districts and provides
information about their assets, infrastructure, population and projects under
development there, as well as a pitch for why investors should consider
putting their money there. The 11 districts are: Downtown Cleveland, W.
25th-MetroHealth Corridor, Health-Tech Corridor, Opportunity Corridor,
Glenville-Rockefeller Park Innovation District, Euclid/Collinwood
Industrial Corridor, Outer Belt Development District, Aerozone Innovation
Hub, Cuyahoga County Airport District, Transportation Boulevard
Development District and Caledonia Park District.
Id. The selection of the zones themselves was not without controversy: “East
Cleveland, the poorest city in Ohio, received no opportunity zones. County officials
had recommended the tract containing General Electric’s Nela Park campus, next
door to Caledonia, but the state passed on it.” Nick Castele, Cuyahoga County Won
Dozens of Opportunity Zones. Now What?, IDEASTREAM (Dec. 10, 2018),
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also developing a “social impact scorecard,” not yet rolled out, whose
purpose is to identify those projects which are “the most socially
positive” and to help those projects attract funding.143
Opportunity CLE received a boost in November of 2019 when the
Ohio State Legislature passed, and Governor Mike DeWine signed,
an additional state tax credit for OZs.144 The “Ohio OZ Tax Credit”
provides a nonrefundable, transferable credit equal to “10% of a
taxpayer’s qualifying investment in an Ohio qualified opportunity
zone fund.”145 Similar to the federal OZ program, this additional
incentive has very few restrictions: the credit tops out at $1 million
per fiscal biennium per individual taxpayer, and the credit is capped
at $50 million statewide per biennium.146 Additionally, there is a
geographic requirement: capital must be invested in “an Ohio QOF
which is a qualified opportunity fund that holds 100 percent of its
invested assets in qualified opportunity zone property situated in an
Ohio opportunity zone.”147 However, the restrictions end there: the

https://www.ideastream.org/news/cuyahoga-county-won-dozens-of-opportunity-zones
-now-what [https://perma.cc/Y456-E4KC]. Although “out of the 320 census tracts
nominated statewide, 213 did come from the poorest quarter of the state’s census
tracts, two thirds of them.” Id.
143. Opportunity CLE Must Follow through to Promote Socially Beneficial
Investments in 64 Local Opportunity Zones: Editorial, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 31,
2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/2019/03/opportunity-cle-must-follow-through-topromote-socially-beneficial-investments-in-64-local-opportunity-zones-editorial.html
[https://perma.cc/5JR9-Z6SP]; see also Mark Opera, Opportunity Zones Were
Designed to Spur Investment in Poor Areas. Are They Doing the Job?,
FRESHWATER
(Sept.
19,
2019),
https://www.freshwatercleveland.com/features/oppzones091919.aspx
[https://perma.cc/W8NY-VSF3] (noting that “[t]hough the so-called scorecard is still
in its beta stage, [director of regional engagement at The Fund for Our Economic
Future, Bradford] Davy is sure that if Opportunity CLE can make its usage
necessary, it can curtail the building of projects clearly aiming to put more bucks in
the investor’s pocket. In fact, Davy says one of the heads of the Cleveland Rocks
Climbing Gym, Kevin Wojton, was involved in interviews to shape the tool in the first
place”).
144. Jeremy Schirra & Dickinson Wright, Ohio’s 10% Investment Kicker: New
Ohio Opportunity Zone Tax Credit Program, JDSUPRA (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ohio-s-10-investment-kicker-new-ohio-91298/
[https://perma.cc/5YMA-LDME].
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. This should help ameliorate the loopholes created by the IRS’s
regulations.
The legislation clarifies whether such fund investments are considered
invested in the zone. For example, for qualified opportunity zone property
that is qualified opportunity zone stock or partnership interest, the stock or
interest is in the zone if during all the qualified opportunity fund’s holding
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tax credit imposes no additional geographic limitations and does not
have community involvement, impact, or transparency requirements.
In the last year, both Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland
— through the city’s Chamber of Commerce and its development arm
— have authorized substantial expenditures to partner with
OZFunds, with the twin goals of bringing capital to the region and
placing restrictions on that capital’s use. In December 2019, the
Cuyahoga County Council148 approved $1.5 million in funding for
Arctaris in the form of an Economic Development Loan, as part of an
investment vehicle which will be partially guaranteed by the Kresge
Foundation’s award.149 In return for favorable loan terms — a
ten-year loan at 2% interest — the county has imposed a set of
restrictions on the fund which layer on top of the Kresge
Foundation’s. According to the language of the resolution passed by
the county, each proposed investment that Arctaris chooses is
reviewable by the council “for social impact,”150 which is defined as
“creat[ing] well-paying jobs accessible to community residents,” and
“improve[ing] access to basic services.”151 The resolution obligates
Arctaris to raise at least $8.5 million of investment on its own, for a
total of $10 million in capital invested. Arctaris is also required to
submit a report detailing “job creation and retention reporting” each
quarter.152 Finally, there are clear impact expectations written into
the resolution’s language: each project that receives an injection of

period for such stock or interest, the use of the corporation’s or
partnership’s tangible personal property was in the designated zone.
Raquel M. Mazarin, Ohio Governor Mike DeWine Signs FY 2020–21 Budget Bill, 29
J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 27, 30 (2019).
COUNTY
COUNCIL,
http://council.cuyahogacounty.us/
148. CUYAHOGA
[https://perma.cc/3R6F-VL6C] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (stating that “[t]he
Cuyahoga County Council is the legislative body of Cuyahoga County government,
made up of 11 elected representatives from across the County . . . . The Council
makes policy decisions for the effective functioning of County government, and is a
link between government agencies and citizens. It has legislative and taxing authority
for the County, and is a co-equal branch of the County government with the
executive branch. This form of government for Cuyahoga County was established in
January 2011, replacing the three-member Board of County Commissioners, when
the Charter form of government adopted by voters went into effect”).
149. Courtney Astolfi, Cuyahoga County Loans $1.5M to Support Manufacturing,
Other Development in Low-Income Areas, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2019/12/cuyahoga-county-loans-15m-to-support-ma
nufacturing-other-development-in-low-income-areas.html
[https://perma.cc/W35J-7NYG].
150. Cuyahoga Cty., Ohio, Res. R2019-0255 (2019).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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capital from this new fund is expected to create “300 permanent jobs”
within three years after its completion.153 While these expectations
are not explained in the resolution itself, the resolution is likely
designed to prevent the county’s investment from being used to
finance projects which have only a short-term impact on job creation
(generally in the form of construction jobs) and which are, as a result,
considered socially undesirable.154
In addition to wanting to attract capital generally, part of the
county’s motivation for investing in Arctaris was the desire to
revitalize its lagging manufacturing sector.155 Manufacturing was
once the lifeblood of the region’s economy but declined precipitously
during American deindustrialization in the second half of the
twentieth century.156
There are encouraging signs of a manufacturing recovery, however,
and regional officials are hopeful that OZs can help catalyze it.
Northeast Ohio is home to 1200 manufacturing companies — 300 of
which are located in OZs.157 Ohio workers are employed in
manufacturing at twice the national average and earn, on average,

153. Id.
154. Perhaps the clearest example is self-storage facilities, which some critics have
characterized as “the epitome of development activity that carries . . . little economic
benefit for residents of a distressed community.” Economics in Brief: Chris Christie
Enters Opportunity Zone Investing, NEXT CITY (May 10, 2019),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/economics-in-brief-chris-christie-enters-opportunity-z
one-investing [https://perma.cc/8YS5-XQMX]. Proposed OZ reform legislation
introduced jointly by Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and House Majority Whip Jim
Clyburn (D-SC) agrees: it would “limit investors’ ability to claim tax breaks for
investments such as luxury apartment buildings, self-storage facilities, and sports
stadiums, which wouldn’t likely create significant benefits for low-income residents.”
Samantha Jacoby, Bills Aim to Curb Opportunity Zone Abuses, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y
PRIORITIES
(Nov.
18,
2019,
3:00
PM),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/bills-aim-to-curb-opportunity-zone-abuses
[https://perma.cc/6PNN-L6JJ].
155. See Astolfi, supra note 149.
156. MICHAEL SHIELDS, POLICY MATTERS OHIO, MANUFACTURING A HIGH-WAGE
OHIO
1
(2018),
https://www.policymattersohio.org/files/research/manufacturingohio.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3UVE-EKND] (asserting that “Ohio’s growth as a state is
inextricable from the growth of the manufacturing industries that built its
communities. Deindustrialization has left once-prosperous communities across the
state poorer, weaker, and in some cases smaller. By 2016, Ohio had lost half its peak
manufacturing jobs, and median household income trailed the nation’s by $5,300”).
157. Kim Palmer, Arctaris Impact Investors Aims to Bolster Financing for Area
Manufacturers,
CRAIN’S
CLEVELAND
BUS.
(Nov.
24,
2019),
https://www.crainscleveland.com/government/arctaris-impact-investors-aims-bolster-f
inancing-area-manufacturers [https://perma.cc/NT72-ERL7].
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$11,000 more than workers in other sectors.158 The manufacturing
industry contributed $106 billion to the local economy in 2016, which
was almost 20% of the state’s entire economic output.159 However,
structural problems threaten to stunt manufacturing revitalization:
manufacturing firms are generally undercapitalized because they do
not generate enough revenue to attract investment from banks and
are often overly reliant on loans from the Small Business
Administration.160 Demographics compound this problem: “Over the
next five years . . . 70% of those owners of small to midsize companies
are looking to sell their business and are in need of buyers.”161
OZFunds could be a natural solution to this problem. On the
investor side, they employ “patient capital,” which is by design a
longer-term investment; on the investment side, manufacturing is
similar to real estate in that it is less mobile.162 This potential is at the
heart of Arctaris’s partnership with Cuyahoga County; in an interview
with Cleveland.com, a principal from the firm explained that
manufacturing would be the focus of Arctaris’s investment in the
region.163 This kind of relationship is one of the most exciting policy
innovations in the OZ space: Arctaris has replicated this kind of
model across the country — local collaboration, first loss capital
protection, and a strict set of guidelines about where and how capital
can be invested.

iii. Washington, D.C.
While
Louisville
represents
an
“informal
policymaking/networking” approach to OZ investment and Cuyahoga
County illustrates the power of the philanthropic sector to generate
policy innovations in the OZ space, Washington, D.C. exemplifies
how municipal governments can use already-existing tools to control
OZ investment using a structured economic development process.
The microeconomic climate in the District helps explain why — D.C.
has gentrified at a dizzying pace, particularly over the course of the
last decade.
According to a 2019 report from the National

158. SHIELDS, supra note 156, at 1.
159. Id.
160. Palmer, supra note 157.
161. Id. (continuing that “[i]t is a baby boomer thing . . . . Obviously in Cleveland,
you are dealing with a lot of third- and fourth-generation businesses, and the prospect
that the family is going to step in to take over is unlikely” (internal quotations
omitted)).
162. Id.
163. Astolfi, supra note 149.
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Community Reinvestment Coalition using the most recent data
available, 20,000 black D.C. residents were displaced between 2010
and 2013.164 Of the major American cities analyzed in the study,
“Washington, D.C., was the most gentrified city by percentage of
eligible neighborhoods that experienced gentrification.”165 Investors’
interest has not slowed since the TCJA was enacted. In the spring of
2019, the commercial real estate analytics company Yardi Matrix
named the District the most attractive region for OZ investment on
the East Coast.166
As a result of this context, and the sheer scale of development,
local officials were less concerned about attracting investment dollars
and more concerned about unintentionally accelerating the pace of
displacement: “there was more of a sense in D.C. that the city could
steer the ship and be more selective in terms of what zones it
designated and tailoring those investments through public resources
including land or subsidies.”167
This started with OZ selection: the process of choosing the
District’s OZs, to begin with, was run through the Office of the
Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development (DMPED),

164. JASON RICHARDSON ET AL., NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., SHIFTING
NEIGHBORHOODS: GENTRIFICATION AND CULTURAL DISPLACEMENT IN AMERICAN
CITIES (2019), https://ncrc.org/gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/DPH5-MNUC]; see
also Michael Quander, Cost of Living Contributes to ‘Intense’ Level of Displacement
WUSA9
(Nov.
11,
2019),
in
DC,
https://www.wusa9.com/article/features/producers-picks/gentrification-and-displacem
ent-high-in-dc/65-4543c266-350b-456e-91ab-743b6a108c4d
[https://perma.cc/LH7A-7BEF].
165. Quander, supra note 164.
166. Erika Morphy, DC Is the Most Attractive Opportunity Zone on the East
Coast,
GLOBEST.COM
(Mar.
25,
2019),
https://www.globest.com/2019/03/25/dc-is-the-most-attractive-opportunity-zone-on-th
e-east-coast/?slreturn=20200003153652 [https://perma.cc/F44T-KPED] (explaining
that “[i]t used such indicators as GDP and population growth, number of eligible
OZs, and poverty rates in each area, attributing points for each of these and
calculating the total. The data for the indicators came from The US Census Bureau,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the US Department of Treasury”). Perhaps not so
surprisingly, the methodology underlying this ranking system completely ignored
social impact. In actuality, it penalized OZs for having higher poverty rates: “[f]or the
poverty rate indicator, between 0 and 15 points were awarded in inverse proportion,
with a lower poverty rate leading to more points.” Diana Sabau, Study: Top Counties
for Opportunity Zone Investment, COMMERCIALCAFE (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.commercialcafe.com/blog/top-counties-opportunity-zone-investment/
[https://perma.cc/3X9B-A2KT].
167. Oscar Perry Abello, Now’s the Opportunity for Cities to Work on Their Zone
Defense,
NEXT
CITY
(July
25,
2019),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/nows-the-opportunity-for-cities-to-work-on-their-zone
-defense [https://perma.cc/92YR-YFTL].
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which continues to house the District’s OZ work. Since D.C. is not a
state, the TCJA gave Mayor Muriel Bowser the ability to submit OZs
to the IRS in the same way as governors; DMPED was highly
intentional about selecting zones with “demonstrated need” that had
“investment opportunities that could be paired with complementary
incentives to benefit residents.”168 Ultimately, the IRS certified 25
zones total across the District, with the majority concentrated east of
the Anacostia River in historically poorer Wards 7 and 8.169
The District also received a major boost from the philanthropic
sector: in September 2019, the Rockefeller Foundation announced
that D.C. had been chosen to participate in its “Opportunity Zone
Community Capacity Building Initiative,” which meant the
Foundation would fund technical assistance through LISC to “build a
pipeline of projects and small business investments that move beyond
the early stages of planning and attract private investment in
economically-distressed areas.”170 Mayor Bowser designated Sharon
Carney, who was already working at DMPED, to coordinate
Opportunity Zone efforts.
Mayor Bowser’s stated aim for
implementing the OZ program locally is to maximize benefits to
current residents; Carney explained that the District has approached
this in several ways: one, by providing support and resources for
community-based stakeholders (including projects and businesses) to
learn about OZ and connect with potential investment opportunities;
and two, by helping investors align with community priorities and

168. Solomon Greene, et al., Opportunity Zoning: An Inside Look at How Three
Cities Are Aligning a Tax Incentive with Land-Use Plans to Revitalize
Neighborhoods,
URB.
INST.
(July
25,
2019),
https://www.urban.org/features/opportunity-zoning [https://perma.cc/FU28-JJVD].
169. Designated Opportunity Zones in DC, OFF. DEPUTY MAYOR FOR PLAN. &

ECON.
DEV.
(2018),
https://dmped.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dmped/publication/attachments/OZ_
Map%2BTable_for_Print_logo_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9MP-7QP8]; see also Martin
Austermuhle, Investors and Developers Can Benefit from Opportunity Zones in
D.C.,
but
Will
Residents?,
WAMU
(Sept.
18,
2019),
https://wamu.org/story/19/09/18/investors-and-developers-can-benefit-from-opportuni
ty-zones-in-d-c-but-will-residents/ [https://perma.cc/A364-WK3L].
170. Press Release, The Rockefeller Found., The Rockefeller Foundation Awards
Grants to Fuel Plans for Equitable Investment in Opportunity Zones in Washington,
DC,
Oakland,
Dallas,
and
St.
Louis
(Sept.
6,
2019),
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/news-media/rockefeller-foundation-a
wards-washington-dc-oakland-dallas-st-louis-grants-fuel-plans-equitable-investmentopportunity-zones/ [https://perma.cc/6ACV-TX6J]. This also includes two
AmeriCorps VISTA staff, who will serve as community engagement specialists. Id.
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discover resources that can help generate benefits for communities.171
In addition, the District works to align OZ investment with the
structures that the city already has in place for managing
development.172
The first of these structures pre-dates the OZ program by four
decades: D.C.’s Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) system
enacted in 1976. The ANC system is a feature of D.C.’s Home Rule
Charter: locally elected commissioners serve two-year terms as the
“official voice in advising District government . . . on things that affect
While not obligated to follow the
their neighborhoods.”173
recommendations of ANCs, agencies are required by law to assign
them “great weight” and are statutorily barred from taking “any
action that will significantly affect a neighborhood” without “giving
the affected ANCs 30 days advance notice.”174 In effect, the ANC
system can act as a check against socially undesirable or net-negative
OZ investment and, at minimum, provides local stakeholders — who
are the closest to the ground — a voice in the development process.
The second is zoning-related. In late 2019, the D.C. government
completed an update of the city’s Comprehensive Plan, since, “in its
current form, which was approved in 2006, the Comp Plan does not
sufficiently address the District’s long-term needs around housing,
equity, resilience, and public resources.”175 Carney noted the
importance of such structures – including District plans and
formalized community input mechanisms – in guiding OZ
investments.176 In recent years, the District has been amending its
Comprehensive Plan in consultation with tens of thousands of District
The District’s
residents through community engagement.177
Comprehensive Plan serves as the guide for long-term development
and land use in the District and, as such, influences zoning and all

171. Interview with Sharon Carney, Chief Opportunity Zone Officer, Office of the
D.C. Deputy Mayor for Planning and Econ. Dev. (Nov. 14, 2019).
172. Id.
173. Advisory
Neighborhood Commissions: About ANCs, DC.GOV,
https://anc.dc.gov/page/about-ancs (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
174. Id. (“[D]etailing that [t]his includes zoning, streets, recreation, education,
social services, sanitation, planning, safety, budget, and health services.”).
175. Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Wash., D.C., Bowser Administration
Extends Public Review Period for Comprehensive Plan (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://plandc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/Comprehensiveplan/page_content/atta
chments/PRESS%20RELEASE%20Comp%20Plan%20Extension_Dec2019_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DUM-HUM9].
176. Interview with Sharon Carney, supra note 171.
177. Id.
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projects, regardless of source of financing.178 As OZ investment
continues to flow into the District, “the city is tracking and reviewing
proposals for discretionary development and map amendments in
Opportunity Zones to ensure that proposed projects align with
existing plans and provide benefits to the surrounding community.”179
Mayor Bowser has been clear that one of the highest priorities for
her second term in office is the development of more affordable
housing in the District; the city government is working to use the OZ
program to achieve that goal. This past spring, Mayor Bowser
announced a $24 million commitment to fund projects in D.C.’s OZs,
which “support affordable housing, workforce development, and the
growth of small businesses.”180 This coincided with an announcement
earlier the same month, that the Mayor was proposing an additional
tax on commercial property sales181 to increase the city’s affordable
housing trust fund substantially; in May, the D.C. City Council
enacted a modified version of that tax into law.182
In addition to using tax revenue to incentivize affordable housing
development in OZs, D.C. has another tool at its disposal: the large
amount of publicly-owned land in the District, which the government
can use as an incentive for investors.183 Essential to catalyzing any
OZ deal is the concept of “de-risking” it for the OZFund contributing
the capital — which looks different depending on whether the
investment is a piece of real estate to be developed or a

178. Id.
179. Greene et al., supra note 168.
180. Opportunity
Zones
in
Washington,
DC,
DC.GOV,
https://dmped.dc.gov/page/opportunity-zones-washington-dc (last visited Mar. 17,
2020) [https://perma.cc/X7UP-EXVN].
181. Jon Banister, Bowser Unveils New CRE Tax Plan to Build Affordable
Housing,
BISNOW
(Mar.
19,
2019),
https://www.bisnow.com/washington-dc/news/affordable-housing/bowser-aims-to-gro
w-affordable-housing-fund-with-tax-on-commercial-property-sales-98056
[https://perma.cc/RJ2K-PACX].
182. Alex Koma, D.C. Council Signs off on New Budget Full of Tax Changes,
More Funding for Housing Programs, WASH. BUS. J. (May 28, 2019),
https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2019/05/28/d-c-council-signs-off-on-ne
w-budget-full-of-tax.html [https://perma.cc/3EDZ-NXK7].
183. Greene et al., supra note 168. “The city is also contributing public land and
financing in these areas, which can help ensure that new projects will provide job
opportunities for local residents and businesses through DC’s first source hiring and
small business contracting requirements.” Id. See also Cheryl Cort, Public Land
Deals Give Hot Neighborhoods Affordable Housing, GREATER GREATER WASH.
(June
4,
2012),
https://ggwash.org/view/27915/public-land-deals-give-hot-neighborhoods-affordable-h
ousing [https://perma.cc/SCP8-RHMQ].
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business-seeking venture capital funding.184 While this tool is still in
its early stages, the use of public land for OZ development holds
tremendous promise: if the city already owns a piece of property and
can contribute it to an OZ transaction, that both lowers the risk
inherent in the deal (by removing the need to purchase the property
in the first place) and gives the city enormous leverage in dictating
what kind of project will be built.185
Finally, the District has created a number of policy initiatives that
fall into the “informal policymaking” category: it created a network of
professionals (like lawyers and accountants) called the “OZ
Community Corps” that has agreed to provide pro bono services to
District residents, small businesses, and nonprofits seeking to start
projects — or attract investment — in OZs.186 Also, in July 2019, it
launched an “Opportunity Zone Marketplace,” a platform for
investors to use to find OZ-eligible projects; projects on the
marketplace site must meet one of the criteria established by the city
for projects that are socially beneficial.187
IV. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF OPPORTUNITY ZONE
PROGRAMS

The case studies discussed in Part III represent a range of different
policy responses to the OZ Program across a spectrum, from informal
government policy to formal policymaking.188 The ultimate yardstick
for judging the utility of any of these methods will be their effect: do
they attract OZ investment? And even more crucially, does that
184. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98.
185. For an analogous, though not OZ-related, project illustrating this principle,
see Elena Knopp, As Bayfront Master Developer, Jersey City Can Call Shots, NJBIZ
(July
9,
2018),
https://njbiz.com/as-bayfront-master-developer-jersey-city-can-call-shots/
[https://perma.cc/4RK3-57DA].
186. Become a Service Provider: OZ Community Corps, GOV’T D.C.,
https://ozmarketplace.dc.gov/pages/community-corps-service-providers
[https://perma.cc/W28U-T8XW] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
187. Press Release, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning & Econ. Dev., Mayor
Bowser Hosts Fifth Annual March Madness Featuring Senator Scott and
Congresswoman Norton to Highlight Opportunities for All (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://dmped.dc.gov/release/mayor-bowser-hosts-fifth-annual-march-madness-featur
ing-senator-scott-and-congresswoman [https://perma.cc/39DN-62LL].
188. Of course, one possible response not considered here is to ban OZ investment
entirely, or to place a moratorium on their use, which Boulder, CO adopted and then
reversed. See Sam Lounsberry, Boulder Council Lifts Opportunity Zone
Development
Moratorium,
DAILY
CAMERA
(Oct.
16,
2019),
https://www.dailycamera.com/2019/10/16/boulder-council-lifts-opportunity-zone-deve
lopment-moratorium/ [https://perma.cc/KKQ6-B2AJ].
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investment catalyze the kind of economic development that lifts
low-income communities out of poverty, or does it simply act as a tax
giveaway for the rich on the investor side while simultaneously
accelerating gentrification and displacement on the community side?
It will be years before those questions are answered or are even
answerable. However, since the OZ program is now two years old,
the IRS regulations have been finalized, and OZFunds have raised
and deployed several billions of dollars in capital, we can draw some
preliminary conclusions about state and local action. Accordingly,
this Part evaluates the policies articulated above and suggests a
course of action for state and local governments, based on the
findings in Part III and also on a set of tools traditionally in the local
government toolkit.
A. Evaluation

In the spring of 2019, the trade publication Institutional Investor
published an extremely well-sourced article titled, “Is Anyone
Actually Investing in Opportunity Zone Funds?” Its answer, in short,
was “not really,” or at least, “not to the extent the investment
community thought they would.”189 One challenge the article
highlights is the extended lock-up period: it quoted one fund manager
who said that OZs are “a longer-term investment that takes more
consideration before pulling the trigger.”190
But perhaps a more fundamental challenge to using OZs for impact
is the uphill battle of changing “operating norms”: since capital tends
to follow pre-set channels, the default position of investors looking at
OZs is to do what they have always done — find the safest possible
investment, whether or not it is going to improve outcomes for poor
neighborhoods and their residents; if no safe investments are readily
apparent, investors will stay away.191 And so a crucial role that state
and local governments can play in the OZ space is to help solve this
coordination problem: to help bureaucrats and investors speak the
189. See Alicia McElhaney, Is Anyone Actually Investing in Opportunity Zone
Funds?,
INSTITUTIONAL
INV.
(May
23,
2019),

https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1fjptxryzv07y/Is-Anyone-Actually-Inve
sting-in-Opportunity-Zone-Funds [https://perma.cc/M4WJ-CBW4]. Though it is
worth noting that there was a huge influx of capital to OZFunds in the closing weeks
of 2019. See Michael Novogradac, Opportunity Zone Resource Center,
NOVOGRADAC
(Jan.
8,
2020),
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/opportunity-funds-listing-shows-str
ong-increase-investment [https://perma.cc/5AD8-TLC8].
190. McElhaney, supra note 189.
191. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98.
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same language, to identify worthwhile investments by engaging with
communities, and to stop unproductive investments. Some OZFunds
will seek out socially beneficial projects and invest in them on their
own, motivated simply by a desire to create impact.192 But without
strong participation from government, most funds likely will not.
Knowing what we know now — that the scale of OZ investment is
significant, though far short of initial predictions193 — a central
challenge has emerged: state and local actors need to walk a fine line
between attracting investment on the one hand while simultaneously
setting up guardrails to direct capital toward worthwhile projects and
discourage investment in projects that are either net-negative or
which will push out longtime residents (especially residents from
historically marginalized communities).
These goals are not
diametrically opposed, but they are in tension with one another:
advertise OZ-eligible investments too heavily (and layer on too much
public money in incentives) and governments risk accelerating
displacement and gentrification. However, if state and local actors
create too many guardrails — in a way that is perceived as
anti-investment — they will scare away investors altogether and lose
out on the opportunity to inject capital into places that need it badly.
Overall, state and local governments should take three affirmative
steps to attract and direct OZ funding for impact in order to walk the
fine line described above. First, they should use informal
policymaking power to identify and then advertise socially impactful
projects. Next, they should craft a package of incentives or capital
unique to their local context, though with extensive strings attached.
Finally, they should reserve the power to ward off damaging
investments. These three policy prescriptions are designed to help
government officials — largely in the community economic
development space — strike an appropriate balance.
The first step that state and local governments should take is to
create marketing materials and pitchbooks similar to the one the City
of Louisville built with help from Bruce Katz and Accelerator for
America.194 That process ought to begin by actively engaging
community stakeholders in a conversation about where investment
would be most impactful. Cities like Washington, D.C. (or New York

192. See id.
193. As of summer 2020, when this Note went to press, the most recent data
available from Novogradac showed that roughly $4.46 billion had been invested in
OZFunds, far short of initial expectations. See Novogradac, Opportunity Funds
Listing, supra note 22.
194. See supra Section III.C.

1168

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

with its Community Board system) which already have a mechanism
in place to “encourage and facilitate the participation of citizens
within City government,” are at a natural advantage, though lacking
such a system is by no means an insurmountable roadblock.195 Lining
up projects for investors provides a starting point for a conversation
about where investment can do the most good as well as generate the
most return. Governments should also pay very close attention to the
Governance Project’s “Plug-and-Play” tool when it is released, since
it can go a long way toward making deals more attractive.196
Another trend which has emerged from the constellation of state
and local OZ early adopters is that many of the most successful
regions, which are generating investment and placing meaningful
restrictions on it, have adopted a “carrot and stick” approach, under
which they offer capital or an additional incentive in exchange for
restrictions. And so, the second step that state and local governments
should take is to follow this lead.
In doing so, they should seek to craft a package of incentives that is
reflective of the local economic context. For instance, there is a
crucial distinction between the types of incentives that are appealing
to funds that invest in real estate projects and funds that invest
venture capital dollars at the seed or the growth stages — in other
words, in operating businesses. Much of the OZ coverage in the
national press, particularly the most controversial coverage, has
focused on real estate projects. In reality, many of the OZ program’s
creators, and its highest-profile advocates, now argue that operating
businesses should be the real focus of investment moving forward
since they can be more impactful and since the abuse potential may
be lower.197
For OZFunds investing in real estate, the package of tax incentives
that many states have proposed — and some have enacted — might
195. Community
Boards
Explained,
NYC.GOV,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/qnscb1/html/explained/explained.shtml
[https://perma.cc/M4FV-S2S6] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
196. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98.
197. See Matthew Rothstein, Real Estate Is Not the Heart of the Opportunity
BISNOW
(June
30,
2019),
Zone
Program,
https://www.bisnow.com/national/news/opportunity-zones/opportunity-zones-operati
ng-business-investment-focus-treasury-99674 [https://perma.cc/K9WZ-4VVX].
Please remember that we’re all dealing with real estate, while the
regulations were meant for businesses and jobs, jobs, jobs,” Friedman said.
“If everyone [just] builds real estate, we’re going to have all kinds of
stranded real estate in this country . . . . The corporations have to go to OZs,
which they will because the advantages [for them] are unbelievable.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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be impactful.198 One tool which could help incentivize targeted real
estate development in OZs is for states and municipalities to help
lower the cost basis of development: first, by providing access to
cheap debt, and also by de-risking the development cycle.199
Washington, D.C.’s commitment to provide $24 million in funding for
affordable housing in OZs is a great example of the former — more
states and cities should follow its lead. To de-risk development, state
and local governments should also offer expedited zoning approval
for OZ investments that are determined to offer meaningful
community benefits.200
However, expedited zoning approval, or additional tax incentives,
are unlikely to be effective for OZFunds investing in operating
businesses. On those kinds of deals, operating businesses may
present higher risks if they lack collateralized real estate assets.201
The most impactful step that state and local governments can take to
attract and direct these investment dollars is likely to offer catalytic
first-loss capital. Since venture capital as an asset class is risky, a
priority for OZFund managers is to minimize or eliminate downside
risk.202 States and municipalities who want to use OZs for impact can
maximize their influence and also scale up investment dollars by
providing this sort of protection for investors.
Whether they offer incentives in the form of tax benefits,
accelerated zoning approval, or catalytic first-loss capital, state and
local governments should attach significant restrictions — in the form
of legally binding covenants — that require community engagement,
transparency, scale, and impact. The Kresge Foundation’s work is a
terrific model; the only logical criticism that can be leveled against it
is that its scale is simply too small to keep pace with net-negative
investment from OZFunds who are not concerned with social impact
at all. The philanthropic sector — and state and local governments —
should invest more dollars in the sort of first-loss capital that Kresge
allocated and which localities like Cuyahoga County then
turbocharged with additional capital. The good news is that many of
198. See, e.g., Novogradac, State, Local Governments, supra note 23.
199. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98.
200. See, e.g., Opportunity Zones 101, LOC. INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP.,
https://www.lisc.org/our-resources/resource/opportunity-zones-101
[https://perma.cc/GSQ7-8Z7U] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020). “Finally, to the extent these
are going to be large scale investments, local zoning and approval processes would
probably be triggered, which hopefully will offer an opportunity for community
engagement.” Id.
201. Interview with Jonathan Tower, supra note 130.
202. Id.
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the brightest minds in the community economic development space203
have already done the hard work of clarifying what kinds of
additional restrictions on OZ investment would be impactful, and that
those restrictions are being implemented around the country. In
other words, the investment and philanthropic communities have
found an idea that works — catalytic first loss capital paired with
robust restrictions; the next step is to expand that model before it is
too late.
Finally, state and local governments should enact policies to blunt
the impact of damaging OZ investment. Washington, D.C. is a
terrific example of the ways localities that already have strong laws
regulating development can enmesh OZs within that statutory
framework.204 Regions without a similar framework to Washington,
D.C.’s should enact one, and should aim to deploy the wide range of
policy tools available to restrict or encourage development, up to and
including enacting a short-term ban on the construction of
self-storage facilities, or re-zone neighborhoods where developers
have proposed multifamily condo construction. Even if the overall
impact of OZs ends up being significantly smaller than expected,
governments can and should use local regulatory power to push
capital toward social impact.
CONCLUSION

When asked what he thought of the French Revolution, Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai is reported to have said that it was “too early to
say.”205 The same can certainly be said of the OZ program and of the
policy moves that governments have engineered to respond to it.
Some commentators have argued that state and local action to
mold the OZ initiative is unwarranted.206 It does seem as though the
program will be smaller in scope than originally envisioned. But still,
the threat of unchecked capital is very real, especially in rapidly
developing and gentrifying communities. And there is also a very real

203. See Community Partners, supra note 77; see also Toolkit for Maximizing the
Impact of Opportunity Zones, supra note 92.
204. See supra Section III.C.iii.
205. Not Letting the Facts Ruin a Good Story, S. CHINA MORNING POST,

https://www.scmp.com/article/970657/not-letting-facts-ruin-good-story (last visited
Apr. 4, 2020). Although he was likely referring to the 1968 civil unrest in France. Id.
206. Michael Mazerov, Too Soon for States to Consider “Opportunity Zone” Tax
Breaks, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 1, 2019, 12:45 PM),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/too-soon-for-states-to-consider-opportunity-zone-tax-brea
ks [https://perma.cc/9GQ9-X85Y].
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possibility that, in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and the
recession that will almost certainly ensue,207 policymakers will
consider enacting a variant of the OZ program as part of a package of
long-term relief or might even simply expand the original program.
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that partnerships between
government and OZFunds can create scale, impact, transparency, and
community input. More state and local governments should follow
suit. Or as Warren Buffett once observed, “Big opportunities come
infrequently. When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a
thimble.”208

207. Peter S. Goodman, Why the Global Recession Could Last a Long Time, N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/business/economy/coronavirus-recession.html
[https://perma.cc/B9V9-C34V].
208. Letter from Warren Buffet, CEO, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to the
Shareholders
of
Berkshire
Hathaway,
Inc.
15
(Feb.
26,
2010),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2009ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN5R-UE97].

